Three
terrible days
Nehemia Shtrasler,
Haaretz,
It appears that one of the
illnesses caused by this war has been a loss of a sense of proportion. Were this not the case, it would be difficult to understand
how the public debate in recent days is revolving around money and not blood.
It appears that the public is more interested in the money that the chief of
staff earned (or lost) when he sold his stock portfolio than in the 33 dead and
the dozens of wounded that the Israel Defense Forces
sustained in the three days of intense fighting a week ago, shortly before the
cease-fire went into effect.
The affair began on Wednesday, 10
days ago, while discussions on a cease-fire agreement were taking place at
United Nations. Public sentiment was gloomy in the wake of the continued firing
of Katyushas on the north, and the military and
political leadership lacked "an image of victory," a kind of
impressive final note. As a result, that day, the cabinet took a decision that
authorized the IDF to advance as far as the
We thought at the time that the
decision was designed to pressure
Two days later, on Friday evening,
a draft proposal for cease-fire was formulated at the UN. But then, instead of
making do with political pressure and refraining from going deeper into the
Lebanese quagmire, Chief of Staff Dan Halutz and Defense Minister Amir Peretz persuaded Prime Minister Ehud
Olmert that the time had come to continue the war.
While the UN Security Council was busy passing the cease-fire resolution, four
divisions were advancing toward the Litani. They came
up against fierce resistance from Hezbollah, which had been preparing for just
a battle, with hundreds of anti-tank missiles - and the IDF walked into the
trap.
The first Lebanon War had already
clearly shown that it is hard to deploy armored
divisions in mountainous terrain. However, because the IDF wanted to achieve
"an image of victory" on the Litani, there
was a need to act quickly, and the results were grave - 33 killed in three
days.
The most bitter and costliest
battle of all was waged in the central sector, at Wadi
Salouki. There, the tanks encountered Hezbollah
squads that waited for them in ambush, above the wadi,
with heavy anti-tank fire. The area in question is a particularly steep slope
where there is only one route of passage, and IDF forces were thus hit hard.
Tanks were struck by anti-tank missiles and 12 soldiers were killed, among them
two company commanders.
The soldiers were told that this
was the final note of the war and was "a battle for the mind" - to
prove to Hezbollah that the IDF is determined. These are particularly cruel
words, for what did the IDF want to etch into the minds of the Hezbollah fighters
- that an IDF tank can go up in flames?
During those three days (60 hours
in fact) of fighting, Hezbollah notched up another achievement - the bringing
down of a helicopter, and killing its five crew members. A short while before
it was hit, the helicopter had been carrying 30 fighters; one can only imagine
what would have happened had the helicopter been taken down then.
The territory that was occupied
during those 60 hours of bitter and costly fighting is now being evacuated
hastily because it is of no use. The IDF did not reach the Litani.
The idea, ridiculous from the outset, that entering deep into the territory
would allow the IDF, after the cease-fire, to sweep
the villages that had been encircled and thus capture Hezbollah fighters and
disarm them is no longer being heard; that has been utterly forgotten.
The IDF is now trying to retreat
quickly from the positions it captured, fearing that its soldiers will become
sitting ducks for guerrilla actions. It wants to withdraw to the ridge of hills
that overlooks the northern border, at a distance of two kilometers
from it, no more. It is just waiting for the Lebanese Army to say that it is
ready to take responsibility.
If this is the case, why did the
army embark on this unnecessary battle? Why were so many soldiers sacrificed
and so many wounded?
One of the cruelest
laws of war says that when the top brass make an erroneous and cynical
decision, the rank-and-file soldiers become heroes because they have to correct
things. And indeed, there are many stories of heroism from those final 60
hours.
It turns out, meanwhile, that
Hezbollah is not disarming, that it is remaining in southern
Dan Halutz,
therefore, does not have to step down because of the affair of his stocks. That
is too small and trivial a matter. He has to go, along with Ehud
Olmert and Amir Peretz, because of the last three days of fighting, which
were so unnecessary and so painful.
Source:
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/751957.html