Resolution 1701: Diplomatic cover
for a climb-down
Resolution 1701 [1],
calling for “a full cessation of hostilities” in
The cessation was not brought about
by the passing of resolution 1701. It
was brought about by the
So the
Immediate ceasefire
The Security Council normally reacts
to an outbreak of hostilities anywhere in the world by calling for an immediate
ceasefire and the restoration of the status quo ante. Such a resolution may or may not have any
impact on the hostilities, but it is the usual thing to do. However, in this instance, the
Instead, to buy
A full cessation of hostilities
Famously, in Paragraph 1, resolution
1701 calls for “a full cessation of hostilities” but then says that the “full”
doesn’t apply to
“[The Security Council] Calls
for a full cessation of hostilities based upon, in particular, the immediate
cessation by Hezbollah of all attacks and the immediate cessation by
The paragraph is illogical – how can
there be “a full cessation of hostilities” if one side is not required to cease
“all” military operations, but only “offensive” military operations? And this is supposed to be “international
law”!
In any case, to ask Israel to cease
“offensive” operations is hilarious, since throughout its history it has never
admitted to engaging in any “offensive” military operations. All its actions, including the laying waste
of
What
In reality, what matters is not what
resolution 1701 says, but what the
Media talk about the ceasefire being
under threat because of a failure of
It will be stationed in southern
It’s doubtful if it is capable of
stopping Hezbollah mounting attacks across the border into Israel or firing
rockets into Israel, if it has a mind to do so (which is highly unlikely in
present circumstances), since no less a person than the US Secretary of State, Condoleezza
Rice, said on 15 August 2006 [2] that there
was no expectation that UNIFIL was going to disarm Hezbollah.
UNIFIL - an interim force
UNIFIL - United Nations Interim Force in
“upon
22
years later, in May 2000,
Over
28 years later, the force is still in southern
Biased towards
The text of resolution 1701 is a
dog’s breakfast, bearing the marks of repeated amendment. Its meaning is opaque,
particularly with regard to the duties of the enhanced UNIFIL and the degree of
force it is authorised to use, and under what circumstances it can use it.
It is overwhelmingly biased towards
It was accepted by the Arab states
including
“The draft resolution does not clearly and
explicitly address the horrors of destruction caused by the Israeli aggression
against innocent civilians and the Lebanese infrastructure. Moreover, it does
not clearly spell out
“Nevertheless, we have
accepted the draft resolution in its present form in order to stop the
bloodshed of innocents and to spare
See
also Tarek Mitri’s uncompromising remarks on behalf of
In a resolution with 19 operative
paragraphs, action is required of Israel in only three of them: Paragraph 1
that calls for it to cease all “offensive” action; Paragraph 2 that calls for
it “to withdraw all of its forces from southern Lebanon”, as the deployment of
Lebanese armed forces and UNIFIL “throughout the South … begins”; and Paragraph
8 that requests the “provision to the United Nations of all remaining maps of
landmines in Lebanon in Israel’s possession”.
Strangely, resolution 1701 doesn’t specifically
call for the release of the two Israeli soldiers captured by Hezbollah, which
Contrary to UN Charter
Resolution 1701 should never have
been passed by the Security Council, because it is contrary to the UN Charter in
two important respects:
(1)
It purports to authorise the enhanced UNIFIL to use force, which can
only be done under Article 42 of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, but it is not
expressed to be a Chapter VII resolution.
(2)
Many aspects of it constitute interference in the internal affairs of
Lebanon, contrary to Article 2.7 of the UN Charter, which says: “Nothing
contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of
any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement
under the present Charter …”
In a sense, none of this matters since
in practice, like most Security Council resolutions, resolution 1701 will mean what
the great powers, especially the US/UK, want it to mean. But, the UN Charter is supposed to enshrine
the principles governing relations between states in this world, and the
procedures to be followed by the Security Council in addressing problems between
states. That the principles and
procedures have been set aside in order to cobble together a cloak for
But then Article 2.4 of the UN
Charter says:
“All Members shall refrain in their international relations
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state …”
Is there a day goes by without the
Not Chapter VII
Security Council resolutions under
Chapter VII of the UN Charter are meant to deal with “the existence of any
threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression” to quote from
the first Article of Chapter VII (Article 39).
The Security Council may make recommendations under Article 40 to remedy
the situation, and, if necessary, enforce these recommendations by imposing
economic sanctions under Article 41, or, failing that, by authorising the use
of “all necessary means”, that is, military action, under Article 42.
A Security Council resolution is
normally expressed to be a Chapter VII resolution, by including within it the
clause:
“Acting under
Chapter VII of the Charter, …”
after
the inevitable preamble. You will find
this in, for example, resolution 678 [5], passed in November 1990 to authorise
the use of force to expel Iraqi forces from
“Acting in support of a request from the Government of
Lebanon to deploy an international force to assist it to exercise its authority
throughout the territory, [the Security Council] authorizes UNIFIL to
take all necessary action [my
emphasis] in areas of deployment of its forces and as it deems within its
capabilities, to ensure that its area of operations is not utilized for hostile
activities of any kind, to resist attempts by forceful means to prevent it from
discharging its duties under the mandate of the Security Council, and to
protect United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment,
ensure the security and freedom of movement of United Nations personnel,
humanitarian workers and, without prejudice to the responsibility of the Government
of Lebanon, to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence;”
The phrase “all necessary action” means force.
In the drawing up of the resolution, there was obviously
a lot of argument between the parties concerned. The Arab states didn’t want a Chapter VII
resolution that unambiguously mandated UNIFIL to use force, lest it be used to
attempt to disarm Hezbollah presumably. Before
the resolution was voted on, Sheikh Al-Thani, the Qatari Ambassador to the UN told the
Security Council [4]:
“We welcome the fact that the draft resolution is limited
to augmenting the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), that its
mandate will continue to be subject to the provisions of Chapter VI of the
Charter, …”
In which case, it shouldn’t have authorised the use of
force.
UNIFIL
duties
The duties of the enhanced UNIFIL are set out in
Paragraph 11 of resolution 1701. These
are its original observer role under resolutions 425 and 426, plus:
(a) Monitor the cessation of hostilities;
(b) Accompany and support the Lebanese armed forces as
they deploy throughout the South, including along the Blue Line, as Israel
withdraws its armed forces from Lebanon as provided in paragraph 2;
(c) Coordinate its activities related to paragraph 11
(b) with the Government of Lebanon and the Government of Israel;
(d) Extend its assistance to help ensure humanitarian
access to civilian populations and the voluntary and safe return of displaced
persons;
(e) Assist the Lebanese armed forces in taking steps
towards the establishment of the area as referred to in paragraph 8;
(f) Assist the Government of Lebanon, at its request,
to implement paragraph 14;
Of
these, only (e), and to a lesser extent (f), is controversial. (a) is essentially the original UNIFIL role;
(b) and (c) assigns UNIFIL a carer role in respect of the Lebanese armed forces
in south Lebanon, which is unnecessary but harmless; (d) has a humanitarian
purpose, which may turn out to be UNIFIL’s main role (since, thanks to Israel,
there’s plenty of humanitarian work to be done), in addition to the observer
duties it has always performed.
The
area referred to in (e) is the buffer zone defined in Paragraph 8, which “calls for
“security arrangements to prevent the resumption of
hostilities, including the establishment between the Blue Line and the Litani
river of an area free of any armed personnel, assets and weapons other than
those of the Government of Lebanon and of UNIFIL as authorized in paragraph 11,
deployed in this area;”
This is aimed at creating a buffer
zone from the Israeli border to the Litani river free from Hezbollah military
personnel, assets and weapons. But, on
"Everybody understands that the disarmament of
Hezbollah as a whole is not going to be done by force.”
So, precisely how UNIFIL is going to
help the Lebanese Army to create this buffer zone is a mystery. Since the Lebanese Army is not going to
disarm Hezbollah either, it is a mystery how this buffer zone is going to be
created.
(The text could be interpreted as
giving UNIFIL licence to take military action to expel Israeli forces back over
the Blue Line, if they cross it into
(f) is concerned with assisting the
Lebanese Government
“to secure its borders and other entry points to prevent the
entry in
in accordance with Paragraph 14. But, as (f) states, this is at the request of
the Lebanese Government, so UNIFIL may have no role here either.
Are 15,000 troops necessary?
President Chirac had a point when he
questioned whether the enhanced UNIFIL needed anywhere near 15,000 troops. The question is: does UNIFIL need to be
enhanced at all? The answer is YES –
otherwise it will look as if the status quo ante is being re-established.
Remember that the original
suggestion for a UN force in southern
Blair’s proposal was part of the
delaying tactics engineered by the US/UK to avoid an immediate and
unconditional ceasefire, in order to give
(To add to the fun in
Interference in the internal affairs of Lebanon
That
The chief instrument for this interference
has been Security Council resolution 1559, passed on
[The Security Council]
2. Calls upon all remaining
foreign forces to withdraw from
3. Calls for the disbanding
and disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias;
Paragraph
2 was aimed at Syrian forces in
President
Chirac began the process that led to the passing of 1559, out of personal
friendship with Rafik
Hariri. Chirac approached President Bush
at the G8 summit at
The
resolution, proposed jointly by the
(Had
Article 27.3 been applied as the authors of the UN Charter intended, resolution
1559 would not have been deemed passed.
According to Article 27.3, a resolution must have “the concurring votes
of the permanent members” in order to pass, in other words, all five permanent
members must vote for a resolution, if it is to pass. When the Soviet Union boycotted the Security
Council in the early 50s, absence was interpreted as concurrence, and, from
then on, as long as a resolution received at least 9 votes, with no permanent
member voting against, that is, vetoing it, a resolution has been deemed
passed. Many, perhaps most, Security
Council resolutions have been deemed passed, despite the fact they never
received “the concurring votes of the permanent members”, as required by
Article 27.3. )
The
essence of 1701 is that 1559 must be fully implemented, for example, Paragraph
3 says:
“[The Security Council] Emphasizes the importance of the
extension of the control of the Government of Lebanon over all Lebanese territory in
accordance with the provisions of resolution 1559 (2004) and resolution 1680
(2006), and of the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords, for it to exercise
its full sovereignty, so that there will be no weapons without the consent of
the Government of Lebanon and no authority other than that of the Government of
Lebanon;”
All
this is an internal matter for the Lebanese Government and people. It is true that Hezbollah’s military wing is
not under the control of the Lebanese Government, because of the way it
developed as a Shiite resistance movement against Israeli occupation. This is an anomaly, but it is an anomaly for the Government
and people of
Having said that, it is worth noting
that resolution 1701 doesn’t specifically require Hezbollah to disarm and, if
Hezbollah were to become a Lebanese state force, the requirements of resolution
1701 would be fulfilled without it giving up any weapons, and, subject to the
approval of the Lebanese Government, it could then replenish its weapons from
Iran or anywhere else, without infringing 1701.
“It is often said, ‘Where there’s a will, there’s a way. But
recent years have demonstrated that where there is a way, there is not always a
will. The way to avoid the crisis between
“In the face of the failure to ensure that the obligations
set out in those resolutions were implemented,
Hezbollah’s
lethal capacities were so severely damaged that it managed to kill 33 Israeli
troops after Gillerman made these remarks, nearly 30% of Israeli military
casualties overall, and on 13 August 2006 it managed to fire more rockets into
Israel than on any other day of the hostilities.
Leaving that aside, it is touching
to observe Israel’s new found enthusiasm for the implementation of Security
Council resolutions, enthusiasm so great that it is prepared to make war for a
month in order to (fail to) enforce just one.
Can we now expect
Non-binding recommendations
When,
prior to the invasion of
(1) That
(2) That the resolutions outstanding against
The latter might be said to be true
about resolution 242 (in which Israeli withdrawal from the
Answering charges of a double
standard as regards
“
“In fact, those statements are the strongest proof that
there is indeed a double standard: one directed against
So,
Chapter VI resolutions are mere “recommendations” by the Security Council that
can be ignored at will by any state that is subject to one, as
Resolution
1559 is a Chapter VI resolution. By the
principle invoked by
Yet,
according to Dan Gillerman,
Labour
& Trade Union Review
www.david-morrison.org.uk
References:
[1] daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/465/03/PDF/N0646503.pdf
[2] www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/70740.htm
[3] daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/368/70/IMG/NR036870.pdf
[4] daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/PRO/N06/464/91/PDF/N0646491.pdf
[5] www.david-morrison.org.uk/scrs/1990-0678.htm
[6] news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/5288224.stm
[7] daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/PRO/N02/644/55/PDF/N0264455.pdf