UN: On the side of the occupiers
Standing beside the President at
the White House on 16 April, the Prime Minister was asked if it was an error
not to involve the UN in Iraq much earlier in the post-invasion process.
He replied that he and the President “have been involving the UN throughout”.
For
once, Blair is absolutely right. The Security Council has been involved
throughout – and disgracefully it has given ex-post facto blessing to the
invasion and occupation. UN involvement
has been to assist the US/UK in maintaining their occupation, not in bringing
it to an end and transferring power to Iraqis.
Prior to the invasion, the UN was
inextricably linked with economic sanctions against Iraq, maintained at the
behest of the US/UK. The UN is now
inextricably linked with the US/UK occupation of Iraq and it isn’t surprising
that, for the first time in UN history, UN personnel have been specifically
targeted for assassination.
The assistance to the occupiers
began with Security Council resolution 1483 passed on
22 May 2003, which authorised the US/UK to sell Iraqi oil and spend the
proceeds. Under Article 23(g) of the
1907 Hague Regulations, occupying powers are forbidden to “seize the enemy’s
property”. In 1483, the Security
Council gave them legal cover to seize and sell Iraqi oil. The resolution was presented as a generous
act, which ended economic sanctions after more than 12 years: it did; it had
to, so that the occupying powers could sell the Iraqi oil they had seized.
The ultimate example of UN
assistance is in Security Council resolution 1511, passed on
16 October 2003. This changed the
occupying forces into UN forces under US command and mandated their use to put
down resistance to occupation.
Resolution 1511 was passed unanimously: the chief opponents of the
invasion – France, Germany and Russia – voted for these measures, and so did
Syria and Pakistan.
US Marines were acting with the
full authority of the Security Council when they killed upwards of a thousand
people, most of them non-combatants, many of them children, in Falluja in
April.
You don’t believe it? Then, read paragraph 13 of resolution 1511,
which says:
“[The Security Council] Determines that the
provision of security and stability is essential to the successful completion
of the political process as outlined in paragraph 7 above and to the ability of
the United Nations to contribute effectively to that process and the
implementation of resolution 1483 (2003), and authorizes a multinational
force under unified command to take all necessary measures to contribute to the
maintenance of security and stability in Iraq”.
Lest there be any doubt that “the multinational force under unified
command” refers to the occupation forces, here is what John Negroponte, the US
Ambassador to the UN, said after 1511 was passed:
“… the resolution establishes a United Nations
authorized multinational force under unified United States command.”
Resolution 1511 gave the US a free hand to
use “all necessary measures”, that is, up to and including lethal force, to put
down resistance to the occupation. Of
course, it isn’t couched in that language: it is couched in the language the
US/UK like to employ about bringing “security and stability” to Iraq. There is no recognition that what it going
on in Iraq is armed resistance to occupation, and that the most effective way
of ending armed resistance to occupation is to end occupation.
It is the ultimate in twisted reasoning
that the Security Council should authorise the US to use lethal force against
Iraqis to bring “security and stability” to Iraq so that the UN can operate
there. But that’s what the resolution
says. The process has been so
successful that the US is now trying to get states to volunteer to supply
troops for a blue-helmeted force to protect UN personnel in Iraq.
It is extraordinary that the powers led by
France, who refused to back the US/UK invasion of Iraq in March last year,
backed the use of force to maintain the US/UK occupation six months later, and
called for other member states to send troops to help maintain it (see
paragraph 14 of 1511).
IGC recognised
Not only that, in the same resolution they
recognised the US-appointed Iraqi Governing Council and its ministers as the
sovereign government of Iraq. See
paragraph 4, which says:
“[The Security Council] Determines that the
Governing Council and its ministers are the principal bodies of the Iraqi
interim administration, which, without prejudice to its further evolution,
embodies the sovereignty of the State of Iraq during the transitional period
until an internationally recognized, representative government is established
and assumes the responsibilities of the Authority;”
This is not a trivial matter:
it provides cover for the US/UK to alter Iraqi law. As occupying powers, they are forbidden to alter Iraqi law under
Article 43 of the Hague Regulations.
But, 1511 enabled them to say that it was the sovereign government of
Iraq recognised by the UN that altered the law, not them as occupying
powers. Thus when, contrary to existing
Iraqi law, Paul Bremer signed Order 39 to allow non-Arab foreign ownership of
Iraqi companies, it was, they said, the work of the Iraqi finance minister, on
behalf of the sovereign government of Iraq, recognised by the UN. As Hilary Benn explained in a letter to the
Guardian on 30 October:
“The measures on foreign investment in Iraq were
introduced by the finance minister, Kamel al-Keilami, with the support of the
Coalition Provisional Authority, and were supported by the governing council –
which is recognised by the UN in the resolution approved unanimously last
Thursday as embodying the sovereignty of the state of Iraq during the
transition to representative government.”
New
“sovereign” government
The UN is
now involved in the creation of a new “sovereign” government of Iraq. Like the present one, it is not going to be
elected by the Iraqi people, but this time it appears that the US is going to
allow Lakhdar Brahimi,
Kofi Annan’s Special Advisor on Iraq, to select it. Like the present one, it will exist in the shadow of the
occupying powers and their 150,000 troops.
It is supposed to be an interim government lasting six or seven months
only, by which time elections are due to be held to a National Assembly, out of
which a new government is supposed to be formed.
One could be forgiven for asking:
why bother? Why not leave the present
arrangements in place until elections are held? What’s the point of replacing one powerless unelected government
by another powerless unelected government, which will last for a mere six
months?
There is a point to it: it is that George
Bush is running for re-election next November and, in order to improve his
chances, he needs to give the impression to the American people that there is
light at the end of the tunnel in Iraq.
Hence, 30 June – before the presidential election campaign gets under
way in earnest – was chosen as the date for the “handover of sovereignty” to
Iraqis. No matter what happens, the 30
June date is immoveable – because the date of the presidential election is
immoveable.
This date was set in an
“agreement” between the US and its appointees on the Iraqi Governing Council on
15 November last year. The detail of
the “agreement” has been radically changed since, chiefly due to pressure from
Ayatollah Sistani, but the 30 June handover date remains intact, since it is
vital to George Bush’s re-election.
The Ayatollah objected most
strenuously to the proposal to create a National Assembly, out of which the new
government was supposed to be formed, by holding “caucuses” in each of Iraq's
18 governorates. The Ayatollah demanded
direct elections to the Assembly. The
US said it couldn’t be done in time.
Eventually, the UN was brought in to mediate, and Kofi Annan sent a
fact-finding mission to Iraq led by Lakhdar Brahimi. It
reported on 23 February, and agreed with the US that elections couldn’t be held
before 30 June but recommended that the “handover” go ahead anyway – which
leaves unanswered the fundamental question of how the new “government” is to be
created.
Brahimi to choose
It is a measure of the desperation
of George Bush that he appears to be willing to allow Brahimi to choose
it. However, it does mean that Iraqis
will have less say in the choice than they would have had under the original
US proposal to hold local caucuses.
Brahimi is
talking about having a government of “technocrats”, who would not participate
further in Iraqi politics. This is to
avoid the accusation that the selected members of the interim government would
have an unfair advantage over others in subsequent elections. He is also talking about appointing a
presidential head of state plus 2 deputies (a Shia president plus Sunni and
Kurd deputies). All this is supposed to
be done before the end of May.
In
addition, he is proposing to hold a large national conference, similar to an
Afghan loya jirga, to elect a "consultative assembly" to serve
alongside the interim government.
Strangely, he proposes that this be done in July, rather than prior to
30 June when it could conceivably have had a role in the creation of the
interim government.
Whether Brahimi will succeed in selecting
a “government” remains to be seen.
Whether that “government” will be accepted by Ayatollah Sistani, who has
pressed for direct elections from the outset, also remains to be seen. Without that, the new “government” is a
non-starter.
George Bush’s plan to have a
carefully choreographed “handover" of sovereignty to Iraqis, as a prelude
to his re-election campaign, has been severely damaged. He used to talk about it as the “end of
occupation”. He doesn’t any
longer. As time has gone by, it has
become increasingly apparent that the “handover” is akin to rearranging the
deck chairs on the Titanic, with John Negroponte, the soon to be US ambassador
to Iraq, rather than Paul Bremer, the head of the Coalition Provisional Authority,
running Iraq.
George Bush is still talking up
the “handover”, understandably so since he has an election to win. “On June 30th, Iraqi sovereignty will be
placed in Iraqi hands”, he told the American people in a nationwide television address
on 13 April. But the rest of the
administration is talking it down. In
an interview
with Reuters on 26 April, Colin Powell, was asked:
“You've said that Iraqi sovereignty will be limited after
June 30th, at least, for example, to the extent that Iraqi armed forces will be
under US control, so you have unity of command. Why should Iraqis view their
new government as legitimate if its sovereignty is limited in any way, and if
they don't actually choose its members?”
A good
question. He replied that the Iraqis
would be given full sovereignty, but they would have to give some of it back to
the US:
“I think we can make the case to the Iraqi people that they are getting
full sovereignty; I hope that'll be accompanied by a UN resolution that also
makes that case. And I hope they will understand that in order for this
government to get up and running and to be effective, some of its sovereignty
will have to be given back, if I can put it that way, or limited by them, an
understanding by them that it's important to let the multi-national force be
able to operate under its own command, US command, with the Coalition forces
under US direction.”
Iraqi
armed forces will be under UN command after 30 June, whether the new
“government” likes it or not. That is
written into the Transitional
Law signed by the US-appointed Iraqi Governing Council last March. The new “government” will not be allowed to
change that law (nor any of the Orders made by Paul Bremer). Article 59(B) of the Transitional Law says:
“Consistent with Iraq’s status as
a sovereign state, and with its desire to join other nations in helping to
maintain peace and security and fight terrorism during the transitional period,
the Iraqi Armed Forces will be a principal partner in the multi-national force
operating in Iraq under unified command pursuant to the provisions of United
Nations Security Council Resolution 1511 (2003) and any subsequent relevant
resolutions. This arrangement shall last until the ratification of a
permanent constitution and the election of a new government pursuant to that
new constitution.”
This may
be largely a theoretical matter given the recent refusal of the Iraqi Army to
put down resistance to the occupation at the behest of the occupier. But
it is indicative of the amount of sovereignty to be exercised after 30 June by
the new “government” that it has been decided in advance that the Iraqi Armed
Forces be under the command of the occupier.
The constant speculation in the media about whether the “handover” on 30 June
might be aborted because of the “security situation” shows a complete lack of
understanding of what is going to happen on 30 June. Nothing is going to change as regards the occupying forces – they
are still going to be there, they are still going to be under US command and
they are still going to be authorised by the Security Council to use lethal
force to put down resistance to the occupation.
UN
resolution
If all
goes as the US wants, and an Iraqi “government” of some sort is installed by 30
June, the Security Council will no doubt pass a resolution recognising it as
yet another embodiment of Iraqi sovereignty.
That is what Powell was talking about in the Reuters interview quoted
above. That is the kind of UN
involvement the US/UK want at the moment.
It cannot
be said that the backing the occupying powers have received from the Security
Council has done them much good on the ground in Iraq. The prize they hoped for was substantial
contributions to the occupying forces from powers that didn’t back the invasion. That hasn’t happened and, to make matters
worse, Spain is about to withdraw its troops (and the other Spanish speaking
troops from the Dominican Republic and El Salvador are going too). Others may follow.
The main
effect of UN involvement so far has been to disable it for playing a role in ending
the occupation, and re-establishing an Iraqi state. It has been on the side of the occupiers, supporting them in
suppressing resistance to the occupation.
From the
outset, the powers that opposed the invasion should have vetoed UN involvement
until the occupiers set an early date for ending their occupation. Their position towards the US/UK should have
been: we’re willing to help, but only when you make a commitment to withdraw. If that had happened, the UN would now be in
a position to assist in a real handover of power from the occupiers to the
occupied, instead of the sham that is scheduled for 30 June.
Labour
& Trade Union Review
May 2004