Iraq: The
occupation goes on
For
George Bush to have a chance of re-election in November, there must soon be
light at the end of the tunnel in Iraq, or at least the appearance of it. That is why 30 June 2004 was chosen for the
supposed handover of power to an Iraqi government, and why the date is
immoveable. It has been chosen to
impress upon the US electorate before the presidential campaign begins in
earnest that the US is not bogged down in Iraq; that Iraq is not another
Vietnam.
This date was set in an “agreement”
between the US and its appointees on the Iraqi Governing Council on 15
November. Since the “agreement” is
entitled Timeline to a Democratic, Sovereign and Secure Iraq, there must
be a suspicion that the Americans wrote it.
Much of the detail of the “agreement” is now back in the melting pot,
chiefly due to pressure from Shia cleric, Ayatollah Sistani, but the 30 June
handover date remains intact, since it is vital to George Bush’s re-election.
The Ayatollah objected
most strenuously to the proposed indirect mode of election to the National
Assembly, out of which the new Iraqi government is supposed to be formed by 30
June 2004. The November 15 “agreement”
states:
“By May
31, 2004, local caucuses will be convened in each of Iraq’s 18 governorates to
elect delegates from among their number for an Iraqi Transitional National
Assembly.
“By June
30, 2004, the Iraqi Transitional National Assembly will elect its leaders and
assume full sovereignty for Iraq”
The Ayatollah demanded direct
elections to the Assembly. The US
objected, in part, because of the lack of an up to date electoral roll. That has the appearance of an excuse rather
than a reason. Direct elections could
be held on the basis of the food ration cards, which all Iraqis possess.
Plan for roll
The US doesn’t seem to be in any
hurry to draw up an electoral roll.
Joel Brinkley reported
in the New York Times on 4 December 2003
that the Iraqi Census Bureau submitted a plan to the US authorities last
October to take a census of the Iraqi population next summer, leading to an
electoral roll being available by 1 September 2004. However, according to Brinkley, the US authorities sat on the
plan and kept it from the members of the Iraqi Governing Council, who were
unaware of it when they agreed to an indirect form of elections on 15 November.
The precise truth behind this is unknown. In answer to a House of Commons written question from Mike
Hancock MP on the issue, Foreign Office Minister Bill Rammell admitted
on 1 March 2004 that:
“The Iraqi Central Statistical Organisation did
propose a plan last year to conduct a census, upon which elections could be
held.”
But he didn’t give any details of the plan, and he said:
“The plan was rejected by the Iraqi Minister of Planning,
to whom the Central Statistical Office reports. No decision was ever taken on this matter by any Coalition body.”
That answer
stinks to high heaven. The Iraqi
Minister of Planning is an appointee of the US appointees on the Iraqi
Governing Council. He has no power in
his own right, and, if the US authorities had wanted to have a census upon
which direct elections could be held, the Iraqi Minister of Planning would not
have stood in their way. So why didn’t
the US authorities proceed with the plan?
The November 15 “agreement”
specifies that:
“By
February 28, 2004, the Iraqi Governing Council will approve a Transitional
Administrative Law that defines the structure of a transitional government and
the procedures for electing delegates to a constitutional convention”.
The Council didn’t make the 28
February deadline, but on 8 March all 25 members of the Council signed what is
now entitled the Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the
Transitional Period, aka the Transitional Administrative
Law. But it is not complete:
Article 2(B)(1) says that an annex has yet to be agreed (on unspecified
matters). As we shall see, in drawing
up the Transitional Law, all the difficult questions have been left for another
day.
The transitional period is
supposed to last from 30 June 2004 to 31 December 2005. On 30 June 2004 what is now termed “a fully
sovereign Iraqi Interim Government” is supposed to take power. Precisely how it is to come into being is
not specified, but it is not going to be by direct elections: all the
Transitional Law has to say about it is
“This
government shall be constituted in accordance with a process of extensive
deliberations and consultations with cross-sections of the Iraqi people
conducted by the Governing Council and the Coalition Provisional Authority and
possibly in consultation with the United Nations.” (Article 2(B)(1))
Six months later, this Interim
Government is to be replaced by a Transitional Government formed after direct
elections to a National Assembly. That
there is to be a Transitional Government drawn from a directly elected Assembly
is a concession to the Shia pressure of recent months: it was not part of the
November 15 “agreement”, where the unelected interim government was to continue
until the end of next year. Elections
to the Assembly are supposed to take place by the end of this year, or at the
very latest by 31 January 2005. Is a
census to be carried out, and an electoral roll prepared, by then?
The National Assembly will have
the task of drawing up a constitution for Iraq. A draft constitution is supposed to be complete, and ready for
putting to the electorate in a referendum, by 15 August 2005 (Article 61(A)),
though this may be extended by 6 months if a majority of Assembly members
request it (Article 61(F)).
If the Assembly agrees a draft
constitution by 15 August 2005, then a referendum is supposed to be held by 15
October 2005 (Article 61(B)). Article
61(C) prescribes that the ratification of the constitution by the Iraqi people
requires more than a simple majority.
It says:
“The
general referendum will be successful and the draft constitution ratified if a
majority of the voters in Iraq approve and if two-thirds of the voters in three
or more governorates do not reject it.”
The additional condition gives the
Kurds a veto on the constitution if they vote as a bloc, which was one of the
reasons why Shia members of the Governing Council were reluctant sign up to the
Transitional Law.
If the constitution is ratified,
elections are supposed to be held under the new constitution by 15 December
2005, with the new government assuming office no later than 31 December 2005
(Article 61(D)).
If the National Assembly fails to
come up with a draft constitution, or if the draft constitution isn’t ratified
by referendum, then elections to a new National Assembly are supposed to be
called.
Which means that the process could
go on indefinitely.
That’s the plan as laid down in
the Transitional Law for devising a new constitution and electing a National
Assembly and forming a government under it.
But, however long that takes, “a
fully sovereign Iraqi Interim Government” chosen in an unspecified manner is to
be in place in a mere 3 months time, and at that point occupation will
end. According to the November 15
“agreement”, on 30 June 2004:
“The
Governing Council and the Coalition Provisional Authority will be
dissolved. This will end the
responsibilities of the Coalition as an occupying power as specified in the
United Nations resolutions.”
So, Paul Bremer and his staff are
all going to pack their bags and leave Iraq on 30 June? It seems a trifle unlikely. No doubt law will no longer be made by
Orders signed by Bremer as the head of the Coalition Provisional Authority, but
it’s a pound to a penny that Bremer’s staff, if not Bremer himself, will
metamorphose into “advisors” to Iraqi ministers, to make sure they do the right
thing.
Bremer, himself, as the public
face of the occupation, will probably have to leave, otherwise the US
electorate might not be convinced that the occupation has ended, as required by
Bush’s re-election campaign.
Be that as it may, we do know that
the 150,000 or so US (and other) occupation forces are not leaving Iraq any
time soon. It has always been said that
any new Iraqi government would have to make an “agreement” with the occupying
powers that these forces would remain indefinitely.
With 150,000 occupying forces in
Iraq, it would have been next to impossible for any Iraqi government, even a
directly elected government, to resist demands made upon it by the occupying
powers. But the Transitional Law has
pre-empted any such “agreement” by placing the Iraqi Armed forces under US
command until a permanent Iraqi government is in place, that is, until the end
of next year at the earliest.
Article 59(B) says:
“Consistent with
Iraq’s status as a sovereign state, and with its desire to join other nations
in helping to maintain peace and security and fight terrorism during the
transitional period, the Iraqi Armed Forces will be a principal partner in the
multi-national force operating in Iraq under unified command pursuant to the
provisions of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1511 (2003) and any
subsequent relevant resolutions. This arrangement shall last until the
ratification of a permanent constitution and the election of a new government
pursuant to that new constitution.”
Whether this includes police and
border guards is not clear. But there
is no doubt that the Governing Council has now agreed that the Iraqi Army be
under US command until an Iraqi government is elected under a new constitution.
The cover for this bizarre arrangement
was provided in Security Council resolution 1511 passed last
October, which transformed the occupation forces in Iraq into UN forces in all
but name, but still under continued US command, and authorised them to use
force to put down resistance to the
occupation.
This is contained in paragraph 13
of 1511, which reads:
“[The Security Council] Determines
that the provision of security and stability is essential to the successful
completion of the political process as outlined in paragraph 7 above and to the
ability of the United Nations to contribute effectively to that process and the
implementation of resolution 1483 (2003), and authorizes a multinational
force under unified command to take all necessary measures to contribute to the
maintenance of security and stability in Iraq”
Paragraph 14 urges states to
contribute to the “multinational force”:
“[The
Security Council] Urges Member
States to contribute assistance under this United Nations mandate, including
military forces, to the multinational force referred to in paragraph 13 above;”
The Iraqi Army, and perhaps other armed forces as
well, will now to be part of this UN mandated force under US command.
Lest there be any doubt that the entity referred to as “a multinational
force under unified command” is, in fact, the occupying forces commanded by the
US, paragraph 25 says:
“[The Security Council] Requests
that the United States, on behalf of the multinational force as outlined in
paragraph 13 above, report to the Security Council on the efforts and progress
of this force as appropriate and not less than every six months;
So, in
practice the “fully sovereign Iraqi Interim Government” to be installed on 30
June 2004, will have its sovereignty limited just a smidgeon – by the presence
of some 150,000 foreign troops in the country, but also by its armed forces
being under the command of the foreign power commanding those troops.
The Iraqi Interim Government, and its successor, the Iraqi
Transitional Government, will have its sovereignty restricted in another
respect also: its writ will not run in the semi-autonomous
Kurdish areas in northern Iraq.
Articles 53(A) and 54 makes that clear.
Article 53 says:
“The Kurdistan Regional Government
is recognized as the official government of the territories that were
administered by that government on 19 March 2003 in the governorates of Dohuk,
Arbil, Sulaimaniya, Kirkuk, Diyala and Neneveh. The term “Kurdistan Regional
Government” shall refer to the Kurdistan National Assembly, the Kurdistan
Council of Ministers, and the regional judicial authority in the Kurdistan
region.”
Article 54 says that, broadly speaking, the Kurdistan Regional
Government “shall continue to perform its current functions throughout the
transitional period” and will have the right “to impose taxes and fees within
the Kurdistan region”. The Kurdistan
National Assembly will have some freedom to amend the application of federal
law within the Kurdistan region.
Article 27(B) says:
“Armed forces and militias not
under the command structure of the Iraqi Transitional Government are
prohibited, except as provided by federal law.”
But an exception is made for the
Kurds in Article 54, where it says that the Kurdistan Regional Government
“shall retain regional control over police forces and internal security”. Uniquely, therefore, the Kurds are allowed
to maintain their own militias.
Federal Iraq?
This maintenance of Kurdish
autonomy highlights a key question about the future structure of government in
Iraq: is it to be a federation of regions defined by ethnic group or religious
confession? Article 4 answers that
question in the negative, saying:
“The federal system shall be based
upon geographic and historical realities and the separation of powers, and not
upon origin, race, ethnicity, nationality, or confession.”
But only
one region is defined, and it is based on Kurdish ethnicity – which flies in
the face of Article 4. Apart from that,
there is provision (in Article 53(C)) that up to three governorates outside
Kurdistan (but not Baghdad or Kirkuk) may form a region.
An added
complication is the Kurdish ambition to have a much larger Kurdish region,
including Kirkuk with its surrounding oilfields, and potentially therefore
access to oil revenue.
As regards
the latter, Article 25(E) of the Transitional Law puts the federal government
in charge of managing “natural resources”, and the revenue derived from their
sale, on behalf of the nation as a whole.
But a federal government would have difficulty resisting demands by a
Kurdistan including the Kirkuk oilfields for control over oil revenues derived
from that area.
Reversing
Arabisation
Linked to
this demand for a larger Kurdistan is a demand that the Arabisation of certain
areas in Northern Iraq, allegedly carried out by Saddam Hussein, be
reversed. In other words, that Kurds
who were expelled be given their property back and Arabs who were given their
property be expelled. If this were
done, the Kurds expect that this would enhance their claims to certain areas,
not least to Kirkuk and its environs.
Article
58(A) of the Transitional Law provides for the reversal of Arabisation:
“The Iraqi Transitional
Government, and especially the Iraqi Property Claims Commission and other
relevant bodies, shall act expeditiously to take measures to remedy the
injustice caused by the previous regime’s practices in altering the demographic
character of certain regions, including Kirkuk, by deporting and expelling
individuals from their places of residence, forcing migration in and out of the
region, settling individuals alien to the region, depriving the inhabitants of
work, and correcting nationality. To remedy this injustice, the Iraqi
Transitional Government shall take the following steps:
“(1) With
regard to residents who were deported, expelled, or who emigrated; it shall, in
accordance with the statute of the Iraqi Property Claims Commission and other
measures within the law, within a reasonable period of time, restore the
residents to their homes and property, or, where this is unfeasible, shall
provide just compensation.
“(2) With
regard to the individuals newly introduced to specific regions and territories,
it shall act in accordance with Article 10 of the Iraqi Property Claims
Commission statute to ensure that such individuals may be resettled, may
receive compensation from the state, may receive new land from the state near
their residence in the governorate from which they came, or may receive compensation
for the cost of moving to such areas.”
There also seems to be claimed
that Saddam Hussein changed the borders of governorates for political purposes,
presumably in Kurdish areas, and Article 58(B) provides for this to be
reversed. Article 58(C) then says:
“The permanent resolution of disputed territories, including Kirkuk, shall be deferred until after these measures are completed, a fair and transparent census has been conducted and the permanent constitution has been ratified This resolution shall be consistent with the principle of justice, taking into account the will of the people of those territories.”
The application of the phrase
“disputed territories” to Kirkuk seems to imply that the inclusion of Kirkuk in
an expanded Kurdistan is a real possibility.
After the Transitional Law was
signed, Kurds in Kirkuk came out on to the streets to celebrate its inclusion
in Kurdistan. They were a little bit
premature, but the Transitional Law gives them reason to hope that it will be
one day, not least because they have been accorded a veto over a new
constitution.
Labour
& Trade Union Review
March 2004