Hutton Report: Government not cleared
The Prime Minister must have
thought that all his Christmases had come at once when he heard what was in the
Hutton report.
He was cleared of the
charge of including the 45-minute claim in the September dossier, knowing it to
be “wrong”, as alleged by Andrew Gilligan on the Today programme on 29 May
2003. That was hardly a surprise, since
he had already been cleared by the Intelligence & Security Committee (ISC)
in its report
of 11 September 2003.
Not only that, Hutton declared
that the dossier as a whole was not “sexed up”, by which he meant that it was
not “embellished with items of intelligence known or believed to be false or
unreliable to make the case against Saddam Hussein stronger” (Paragraph
228(8)).
On the basis of this, the
Government declared itself completely innocent of all charges of mishandling
the intelligence on Iraq’s so-called “weapons of mass destruction”, not just in
the September dossier but in everything it said and wrote in the lead up to the
invasion of Iraq.
In
announcing the Butler inquiry to the House of Commons on 3 February 2004, Jack
Straw said
that “the question of whether intelligence was mishandled in terms of propriety
or dishonesty was dealt with comprehensively by Lord Hutton”, and the
Government was declared innocent – and therefore that the Butler inquiry didn’t
need to revisit that issue. The next
day in the Lords, the Prime Minister’s old flatmate, the Lord Chancellor declared:
Hutton did not establish any such
thing, nor did he say he had done, nor could he have done. He did say that the dossier was not
“embellished with items of intelligence known or believed to be false or
unreliable”. He also said:
“I am
satisfied that Mr Scarlett, the other members of the JIC, and the members of
the assessment staff engaged in the drafting of the dossier were concerned to
ensure that the contents of the dossier were consistent with the intelligence
available to the JIC.” (Paragraph 228(7)).
Perhaps, he was a tiny little bit
naïve in believing that the dossier was intelligence-driven, rather than driven
by the Prime Minister’s requirement that it be “convincing” (to quote from an
e-mail from Campbell to Scarlett on 17 September 2002).
Be that as it may, he never said
that Scarlett and his colleagues were successful in ensuring that the
contents of the dossier were consistent with the intelligence. Plainly, they weren’t. We know that from last September’s ISC
report, which detailed a number of serious flaws in how the intelligence was
presented in the September dossier, including in the Prime Minister’s foreword.
Unlike Hutton, the ISC had access
to all the relevant intelligence and therefore, unlike Hutton, it was in a
position to judge whether the contents of the dossier was an accurate
reflection of the available intelligence.
And it found it wasn’t in a number of respects.
Have the Foreign
Secretary and the Lord Chancellor forgotten about these flaws, which misled the
Prime Minister, never mind the public?
Hutton did not have access
to all the relevant intelligence, so there was no way he could have
“established that the intelligence we had was properly presented in our
dossier”, as the Lord Chancellor said he did.
The Government maintains that John
Scarlett was the author of the dossier, and that it was approved by the JIC,
and that they were free from political pressure in compiling it. Scarlett has confirmed that this was
so. If so, he and the other members of
the JIC should have resigned immediately the ISC report was published, because
it proved they were grossly incompetent.
They produced a dossier that
seriously misrepresented the intelligence available at the time, and
exaggerated the threat from Iraq’s chemical and biological weapons. As a result, the public (and, we now know,
the Prime Minister) was seriously misinformed on matters relating to peace and
war. There could hardly be a more
serious charge, yet these people, unlike Andrew Gilligan, are still in their
highly paid jobs. They should go.
Of course, it may be that they
were (subconsciously?) following orders from their political masters to make
the dossier “convincing”. But, unless
they are prepared to plead that defence, they should go, and go now.
What did the ISC say they got
wrong? Specifically, the report was
critical of the way the dossier presented:
45-minute claim
The ISC said the authors of the dossier should have made
clear that the 45-minute claim referred to battlefield weapons, not missiles
capable of hitting Cyprus:
“The dossier was for public consumption and not for
experienced readers of intelligence material. The 45 minutes claim, included
four times, was always likely to attract attention because it was arresting
detail that the public had not seen before. As the 45 minutes claim was new to
its readers, the context of the intelligence and any assessment needed to be
explained. The fact that it was assessed to refer to battlefield chemical and
biological munitions and their movement on the battlefield, not to any other
form of chemical or biological attack, should have been highlighted in the
dossier. The omission of the context and assessment allowed speculation as to
its exact meaning. This was unhelpful to an understanding of this issue.” (ISC
report, paragraph 112)
Think of the difference it would have made if
Scarlett and the JIC had made it clear that the 45-minute claim applied to
battlefield weapons. First, the Prime
Minister would not have been confused (at least not on the 45-minute
claim). Second, it’s unlikely that the
public would have been misled by lurid “Brits 45 minutes to doom” headlines,
predicting the slaughter of British holidaymakers on beaches in Cyprus.
CBW production
The September dossier made extravagant claims, not
only that Iraq possessed chemical and biological weapons and weapons-related material,
and various delivery systems, left over from before the Gulf War, but also that
it had re-established facilities to produce these weapons (and was trying to
re-establish its nuclear weapons programme).
So, it was not just a matter of getting rid of the remnants manufactured
before the Gulf War: Iraq was producing more weapons today, and therefore the
threat from Iraq was increasing all the time.
For example, there was a bald claim in Blair’s
foreword that “Saddam has continued to produce chemical and biological
weapons”. The ISC made it clear that this certainty was not justified by the
intelligence. This could give the
impression that “Saddam was actively producing both chemical and biological weapons and
significant amounts of agents”, the report said (paragraph 110).
In fact, according to the ISC, the JIC did not know what agents had been produced and in what quantities,
and what quantities, if any, had been put into weapons (in paragraph 58, the
report says that “there was no evidence of munitions being filled with chemical
agents since the first Gulf Conflict”).
The JIC had merely
assessed, based on intelligence, that production of some kind had taken place.
The ISC concluded
that “this uncertainty should have been
highlighted to give a balanced view of Saddam’s chemical and biological
capacity”.
This failure to reflect in the dossier the almost
non-existent intelligence of current production of agents and weapons is of
major importance. If, as seems to be
the case, Iraq did not revive its production of chemical and biological agents
and weapons after the first Gulf War, then, in so far as there was a threat
from Iraq’s chemical and biological weapons in 2002, it was from material left
over from before the first Gulf War, and deemed “unaccounted for” by UN
inspectors. In other words, the threat
was not growing, as the Government maintained, but diminishing as the old
material degraded into harmless sludge.
Few strategic weapons
The ISC report (paragraph 111) also criticised the dossier
for not making it clear that the most
likely chemical and biological munitions to be used against Western forces were
battlefield weapons rather than strategic weapons, and that although there was
a possibility that Cyprus could be hit, there was none at all that London could
be hit.
The report revealed
(paragraph 83) that the first draft of Blair’s foreword had said that Iraq
could not hit London (at least not with a nuclear weapon). It contained the sentence:
“The case I make is not that Saddam could launch a
nuclear attack on London or another part of the UK (He could not).”
That sentence did not appear in the published
dossier. The ISC concluded:
“It was unfortunate that this point was removed from
the published version of the foreword and not highlighted elsewhere.”
As for hitting Cyprus, Iraq had at most 20 al Hussein
missiles capable of doing that. This
was the number unaccounted for by UN inspectors. But, if they existed at all, they had been hidden away since
1991, and therefore there was a question mark over their operability.
The September dossier
claimed (page 22) that Iraq had a variety of delivery systems for chemical and
biological agents, including free-fall bombs delivered from aircraft and
aircraft/helicopter-borne sprayers.
But, given the US/UK domination of the skies over Iraq, the ISC says it
would be “difficult” for munitions of any kind to be delivered from the air
(ibid, paragraph 47). Nowhere, in the
dossier was that made clear either.
The dossier didn’t come within an
ass’s roar of accurately reflecting the intelligence as of September 2002. The ISC said so. And it’s a pound to a penny that, had Scarlett and the JIC
produced one that did, it would never have seen the light of day, because it
wouldn’t have been “convincing”.
If, as Scarlett says, he and the
JIC were not subject to political pressure in drawing up the dossier, then the
only possible conclusion is that they were grossly incompetent. They made a pig’s ear of a straightforward
job of taking the JIC assessments about Iraq’s so-called “weapons of mass
destruction” and turning them into a document that the public could understand.
Hutton did not challenge the ISC’s
conclusions that the dossier was not an accurate reflection of the intelligence
as of September 2002, let alone the reality in Iraq. Futhermore, he accepted that Scarlett and the JIC were free
agents in its production. So, mass
resignation is the only honourable course for them.
As it is required to do by law, the
Government has now produced its official reply
to the ISC report. It summarised the
ISC’s criticisms in paragraph 12, dismissing them as details:
“[The ISC] believes
(paragraphs 110 and 111) that the uncertainty over Saddam’s chemical and
biological capacity should have been highlighted to give a balanced view; that
the nature of the threat should have been more clearly spelt out, in particular
that Saddam was not considered a current or imminent threat to mainland UK; and
that the most likely chemical and biological munitions to be used against
Western forces were battlefield weapons (artillery and rockets) rather than
strategic weapons. The Committee also notes (paragraph 112) that, as the
dossier was for public consumption and not for experienced readers of
intelligence material, the context of the intelligence on the 45 minutes claim
should have been explained, in particular the fact that it was assessed to
refer to battlefield chemical and biological munitions and their movement on
the battlefield.”
The Government’s response in
the following paragraph was:
“The Government believes that
the dossier did present a balanced view of Iraq’s CBW capability based on the
intelligence available.”
That is a pathetic failure to
address the ISC’s closely argued criticisms.
This was followed by:
“The dossier made clear
(paragraph 14, page 16) that the withdrawal of the United Nations Special
Commission (UNSCOM) had greatly diminished the ability of the international
community to monitor and assess Iraq’s continued efforts to reconstitute its
programmes.”
That’s beside the point. The ISC did not criticise the lack of
intelligence, or the inaccuracy of the intelligence as of September 2002. It criticised the fact that the dossier did
not reflect accurately the intelligence that did exist.
It’s a bit rich for the
Government to be lamenting the lack of intelligence from Iraq since UNSCOM was
withdrawn. The dearth of intelligence
was self-inflicted: Clinton and Blair were personally responsible for it by
bombing Iraq in December 1998. UNSCOM
(and IAEA) inspectors had to be withdrawn for their own safety. The bombing, and the withdrawal of the
inspectors, was done without the consent of the Security Council.
(It is interesting to note that the Government response refers to the
“withdrawal” of UNSCOM from Iraq, unlike the dossier which talks about “the
effective ejection of UN inspectors” in December 1998).
Paragraph 14 says:
“The dossier did not seek to
address military scenarios in which Saddam Hussein might consider the use of
CBW.”
The obvious question is: why
did it not seek to do so and how could it provide adequate information to the
public about Iraq’s chemical and biological weapons without doing so? A key
question always was: in what circumstances would Saddam Hussein use his
chemical and biological weapons, assuming he had some to use? In particular, would he use them only if his
regime was threatened?
In fact, as revealed by the
Hutton inquiry, earlier drafts of the dossier did “seek to address military
scenarios in which Saddam Hussein might consider the use of CBW”, and gave the
strong impression that he would use them only if his regime was under
threat. However, understandably, the
Prime Minister had “a bit of a problem” with that, since it gave the
politically inconvenient impression that Saddam would only use chemical and
biological weapons if attacked. And, at
the request of his Chief of Staff, Scarlett excised that bit (having reviewed
the intelligence, of course).
So, it cannot be denied that:
“The dossier did not seek to
address military scenarios in which Saddam Hussein might consider the use of
CBW.”
The Prime Minister insisted
that it be so, because otherwise the dossier would have had to admit the
obvious fact that Saddam Hussein would be much more likely to use any chemical
and biological weapons in his possession if he was attacked than if he was left
alone. And there’s only one conclusion
from that, and it’s not that we should invade Iraq.
Battlefield weapons
Paragraph 14 continues:
“[The dossier]
accurately reflected the intelligence available at the time, which indicated
that Iraq could deliver CBW by a variety of means including battlefield
munitions, such as artillery, mortars and rockets, as well as by ballistic
missiles. It did not seek to address which method of delivery Iraq was most
likely to use.”
Again, the obvious question is: why not? Iraq had thousands of battlefield weapons, capable theoretically
of projecting munitions filled with chemical and biological agents, and at most
20 al-Hussein ballistic missiles capable of hitting Cyprus. Isn’t it just possible that the public would
have been better informed if, as the ISC suggested, the dossier has made it
clear that the most likely chemical and biological munitions to be used against
Western forces were battlefield weapons rather than strategic weapons?
Of course, had it done so, the public might have come to the politically
inconvenient conclusion that providing British forces stayed away from Iraq,
they would most likely be safe from Iraq’s chemical and biological weapons.
45-minute claim
In Paragraph 15 the Government responds to the ISC’s criticism that the
dossier should have made it clear that the 45-minute claim applied to
battlefield weapons. It says:
“The Government understands
the reasoning behind the Committee’s view (paragraph 112) that the presentation
of the 45 minutes issue in the dossier, which was compiled for the public and
not for experienced readers of intelligence material, allowed speculation as to
its exact meaning. However, the Government notes that the dossier did not say
that Iraq could deliver chemical or biological weapons by ballistic missiles
within 45 minutes.”
Indeed, and nor did it say that the claim referred to
battlefield weapons, which – let’s take this very slowly – was the reason why
there was speculation, and why the Prime Minister got confused.
In fact, Downing Street did much better than saying in
the dossier that Iraq could deliver chemical or biological weapons by ballistic
missiles within 45 minutes - it sub-contracted the job to the Sun.
Inspections working
Paragraphs 20-21 deal with intelligence assessments
from October 2002 to March 2003, which were concerned with the inhibiting
effects of UN inspections on the production and storage of chemical and
biological agents and munitions. In its
original report, the ISC referred to JIC assessments from this period, which
indicated that the presence of UNMOVIC and IAEA was having such effect. In its response, the Government agrees:
“The Government accepts that
the inhibiting effect of the UN inspections was relevant and takes careful note
of the Committee’s findings. The JIC Assessments produced in October and
December 2002 and again in March 2003 reflected this point. In December 2002
the JIC specifically pointed out that Iraq’s ability to use CBW might be
constrained by the difficulty of producing more whilst UN inspectors were
present. In March 2003 it stated that intelligence on the timing of when Iraq
might use CBW was inconsistent and that the intelligence on deployment was
sparse. Intelligence indicating that chemical weapons remained disassembled and
that Saddam had not yet ordered their assembly was highlighted. The JIC also
pointed out that other intelligence suggested that the 750km range Al Hussein
ballistic missiles remained disassembled and that it would take several days to
assemble them once orders to do so had been issued.”
That blows a very large hole in
the Government’s case for terminating the inspection process, and invading Iraq
in March last year. Understandably, the
Prime Minister chose to keep the House of Commons in the dark about the
inhibiting effects of inspections when it voted for the invasion on 18 March
2003.
Labour & Trade Union Review
February 2004