France didn’t say NO to military action, just not yet
“But in that case [when inspectors report failure],
of course, regrettably, the war would become inevitable. It isn't today.”
(Jacques Chirac, 10 March 2003)
The prime example of what
Clare short called the Prime Minister’s “honourable deception” to get us to war
was the misrepresentation of the French attitude to military action against
Iraq.
Blair had promised that he
wouldn’t go to war without Security Council authorisation, or at least without
a majority of the Security Council backing military action, albeit a majority
overridden by a veto from France (and/or Russia or China).
After Hans Blix’s relatively
positive inspection report on 14 February, Britain began the quest for a second
resolution authorising military action with the lukewarm help of the US. On that day, only two other members of the
Security Council – Bulgaria and Spain – were willing to vote for military
action. A month later on 17 March 2003,
when Britain finally gave up its quest for a second resolution, nothing had
changed.
Britain didn’t come within an
ass’s roar of convincing a majority on the Security Council to vote for
war. That presented the Downing Street
cabal plotting the course for war with a difficulty: how could Blair’s explicit
promise not to take military action without, at the very least, majority
support on the Security Council be reconciled with the fact that only 4 out of
the 15 members of the Council supported military action?
The solution was to blame France,
to claim that France was being utterly unreasonable: not only was she opposed
to military action in principle, she had sabotaged support on the Council for a
second resolution authorising military action by threatening to use her veto.
In that regard, a remark by
President Chirac remark in a TV interview broadcast on 10 March 2003 was a
godsend to Downing Street. The remark
in question was:
“My position is that, regardless of the
circumstances, France will vote 'no' because she considers this evening that
there are no grounds for waging war in order to achieve the goal we have set
ourselves, ie to disarm Iraq.” (see English translation of interview here).
What
Chirac meant was that as things stood “this evening”, France would use its
veto. But the use of the phrase
“regardless of the circumstances” allowed Downing Street to pretend that he had
ruled out force for all time – and by so doing had torpedoed a second
resolution.
This proposition, wrapped in a
remarkable outburst of anti-French hysteria, was repeated ad nauseam in the
week leading up to the Commons vote on 18 March 2003. It covered Blair’s retreat from his promise not to take military
action without, at the very least, majority support on the Security
Council. It was referred to over and
over again in the Commons debate on 18 March 2003 and played a major role in
limiting the Labour backbench revolt that day.
The resolution for war
itself contained a reference to it:
“That this
House … regrets that despite sustained diplomatic effort by Her Majesty's
Government it has not proved possible to secure a second Resolution in the UN
because one Permanent Member of the Security Council made plain in public its
intention to use its veto whatever the circumstances;”
And, in proposing
the resolution, Blair told the awful story of how France’s perfidy had
undermined support for a second resolution on the Security Council:
“Last Monday [10 March 2003], we were getting very
close with it [the second resolution]. We very nearly had the majority
agreement. If I might, I should particularly like to thank the President of
Chile for the constructive way in which he approached this issue.
“Yes, there were debates about the length of the
ultimatum, but the basic construct was gathering support. Then, on Monday
night, France said that it would veto a second resolution, whatever the
circumstances.”
On that Monday night, France said
no such thing. On the contrary, in the
interview that Monday evening, Chirac made it very clear that there were
circumstances in which France would not veto a resolution for war. Early on in that
interview, he set out two alternative circumstances, one when the UN inspectors
report progress and the other when the inspectors say their task is impossible
– in which case, in his words, “regrettably, the war would become
inevitable”. That portion (which Clare
Short pointed out in the Commons on 4 June 2003) reads:
“The inspectors have to tell us: ‘we can continue
and, at the end of a period which we think should be of a few months’ - I'm
saying a few months because that's what they have said – ‘we shall have
completed our work and Iraq will be disarmed’. Or they will come and tell the
Security Council: ‘we are sorry but Iraq isn't cooperating, the progress isn't
sufficient, we aren't in a position to achieve our goal, we won't be able to
guarantee Iraq's disarmament’. In that case it will be for the Security Council
and it alone to decide the right thing to do. But in that case, of course,
regrettably, the war would become inevitable. It isn't today.”
From
that, it is plain as a pikestaff that France that there were circumstances in
which France would not have vetoed military action, namely, if the UN
inspectors reported that they couldn’t do their job. But, with Blair having promised not to make military action
without at least majority support in the Security Council, a little deceit was
necessary to explain why this had proved to be impossible.
Larger deceit
This deceit was the final element of a larger deceit about
France’s behaviour in the Security Council in the six months prior to the US/UK
attack on Iraq. The story told against
France was that the international
consensus on Iraq in the autumn of 2003, expressed in Security Council
resolution 1441,
had been sabotaged by France refusing to support military action in March, and
that this made war unavoidable.
This
leaves out a large fact about the consensus in the Security Council in November
2003: it was not for war. On the
contrary, the unanimity was achieved because the US/UK backed down on their
attempt to get the Council to vote for war.
The unanimity was for inspection, followed by assessment of inspection
reports by the Council, on the basis of which the Council would decide on
further action.
France
was demonised by the US/UK for refusing to vote for war, and a pretence was
kept up that by so doing France had reversed its position of last autumn. In fact, France maintained a consistent
position throughout, a consistent position with which a large majority of the
Security Council, and the states and peoples of the world, agreed. It was that
the inspectors should be allowed to do their job, until such times as they
reported that they couldn’t, and then and only then should the Security Council
consider military action. This didn’t
suit those in Washington and London who were determined to overthrow the Iraqi
regime, come what may.
Ridiculous proposition
Nevertheless,
in a remarkable leap of logic, Downing Street blamed France for the war, even
though she had opposed it. This
proposition is, of course, ridiculous.
It begins with the assumption that, had France agreed to vote for
military action against Iraq if it did not account for its “weapons of mass
destruction” within a few days, there would then have been a majority on the
Security Council for the second resolution.
It continues with Iraq, faced with this united front in the Council,
coughing up weapons that probably don’t exist, or in a few days proving to the
satisfaction of the US/UK that they had been destroyed, which it has tried and
failed to do for the past five or six years.
But
let us suppose that this highly unlikely sequence of events did occur. To believe that war could have been avoided,
we have to believe that at this point George Bush would have reversed gear, and
taken his troops home, leaving Saddam Hussein in power, having spent the past
year telling the American people that he was an awful threat to US and the
world (and whom around 50% of the US electorate believe was responsible for
9/11). That would not have been a
sensible move for a President seeking re-election next year, and it’s an
absolutely safe bet he would not have made it.
It
is absurd to believe that if France had supported the US/UK in the Security
Council, war could have been avoided.
But three months later, Blair and Straw continue to tell us that France
was responsible for the war – because she refused to vote for it.
Labour & Trade
Union Review
July 2003