Fraser Steel

Head of Programme Complaints

BBC

Broadcasting House

Portland Place

LONDON W1A 1AA.

21 August 2003

Dear Mr Steel

Thank you for your letter of 13 August about my complaints of 12 March on the profile of Saddam Hussein by John Simpson, which was broadcast on BBC4 on Sunday 9 March at 21:40. I regret to say that, as an answer to my complaints, it is entirely unsatisfactory.

First: “Eventually the inspectors were thrown out”

In paragraphs 7 and 8 of your letter, you attempt to deal with my complaint that John Simpson’s statement that UNSCOM “inspectors were thrown out” of Iraq was the opposite of what actually occurred. However, your response is based on the false premise that the UNSCOM inspectors left Iraq for the last time on 11 November 1998, that is, over a month before the bombing began on 16 December 1998.

This is simply untrue: they left on 15/16 December, as is clear from, for example, Richard Butler’s book, Saddam Defiant, from which I quoted. This is confirmed in a chronology of events on the UNSCOM website which has the following entry:

“16 Dec 1998 The Special Commission withdraws its staff from Iraq.”

It is an indisputable fact that on 15 December President Clinton’s request that the inspectors be withdrawn from Iraq was communicated to Richard Butler (who acted upon it immediately) and “the next day”, as I wrote in my letter of complaint, the US/UK bombing of Iraq began.

The sequence of events in the period leading up to the US/UK bombing was as follows.

UN inspectors, both UNSCOM and IAEA, had been back in Iraq since 17 November, having been withdrawn on 11 November, when US/UK air strikes on Iraq were also threatened. This withdrawal was also at the request of President Clinton (see, for example, Saddam Defiant, p202).

On Monday, 14 December, Richard Butler presented to the UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, a report on UNSCOM inspection activities from 17 November (and Mohamed El Baradei did likewise on IAEA activity). As Butler recounts in Saddam Defiant:

“During the course of Monday, December 14, I worked on the final text of my report to the Security Council. I forwarded it to the secretary-general around 5:00PM with the recommendation that he transmit it to the Security Council immediately. He did so, and it was released on Tuesday, December 15, 1998.” (p222)

Kofi Annan forwarded these reports to the President of the Security Council with a covering letter (see document S/1998/1172, dated 15 December 1998). That day, also, Peter Burleigh, the US Ambassador to the UN, called in Richard Butler to request that he withdraw his inspectors. As he wrote later:

“Once my report had been circulated I received a telephone call from US Ambassador Peter Burleigh inviting me for a private conversation at the US mission. As he had less than five weeks before, Burleigh informed me that on instructions from Washington it would be 'prudent to take measures to ensure the safety and security of UNSCOM staff presently in Iraq.' The United States had begun measures to reduce its staff levels in embassies throughout the region and British authorities were doing the same. Repeating a familiar script, I told him that I would act on his advice and remove my staff from Iraq.” (ibid, p 224)

The withdrawal of UNSCOM (and IAEA) inspectors from Iraq began immediately. On 16 December, the Security Council met to consider the UNSCOM and IAEA reports, and while it was in session news was received that the US/UK bombing of Iraq had begun.

It should be emphasised that the withdrawal was not requested by the Security Council. On the contrary, it was done without the knowledge or consent of the Council, as the report of the Presidency of the Council for December 1998 makes clear:

“On 15 December UNSCOM published its report (S/1998/1172, annex II), and on 16 December the members of the Council met in order to discuss the latest developments in Iraq in view of the sudden withdrawal from that country of UNSCOM and IAEA personnel. The members of the Council expressed their concern at this development and at the fact that it had not been consulted when the decision to withdraw UNSCOM personnel had been taken.”

Furthermore, it was not done because of a threat to the physical safety of the inspectors. The UNSCOM and IAEA reports of inspection activity from 17 November (see S/1998/1172) do not record any such threat in that period.

There is absolutely no doubt that the UN inspectors were withdrawn from Iraq on 15/16 December because of the decision by President Clinton and Prime Minister Blair to bomb Iraq, and for no other reason. UNSCOM and the IAEA had no option but to withdraw their staff because that was the only way to ensure their safety and security, which was about to be threatened by US/UK bombing.

So, for John Simpson to say that “the inspectors were thrown out” of Iraq is the opposite of the truth, which I submit should be corrected as soon as possible.

When the Prime Minister said on Newsnight on 6 February 2003 that “the inspectors were put out of Iraq”, Jeremy Paxman corrected him, saying:

“They were not put out of Iraq, Prime Minister, that is just not true. The weapons inspectors left Iraq after being told by the American government that bombs will be dropped on the country.”

If the Prime Minister deserved to be corrected by the BBC for saying that “the inspectors were put out of Iraq”, I submit that John Simpson deserves to be corrected for saying that “the inspectors were thrown out” of Iraq.

Second: “As they [the UN inspectors] left, they suspected that Saddam had kept much of his deadly arsenal intact”

In my letter of complaint, I argued that this is not an accurate account of the UN inspectors’ assessment of Iraq’s proscribed weapons and weapons-related material in December 1998.

In paragraphs 3 and 4 of your response, you refer to the uncertainties that exist about Iraq’s proscribed weapons. But that is irrelevant to my complaint: I didn’t say that that Iraq had no proscribed weapons in December 1998. I accept that there were uncertainties then, and that there are still uncertainties today (though it’s looking increasingly likely that Saddam Hussein’s son-in-law wasn’t lying when he told UN inspectors in August 1995 that all Iraq’s proscribed weapons had been destroyed on his orders).

My complaint is that John Simpson’s remarks did not accurately reflect the view of UN inspectors when they left Iraq in December 1998. The question at issue is the degree to which UN inspectors believed Iraq had been disarmed by their activity since 1991.

Section III (paragraphs 12 to 27) of the Amorim Report (S/1999/356, dated 27 March 1999) summarises the disarmament achievements of the IAEA and UNSCOM in Iraq from 1991 to 1998, and the outstanding questions as of December 1998 (see Annex A for extracts). In my letter of complaint I quoted from paragraph 25 of that section, because it sets out the report’s conclusions about disarmament. These are:

“The elements presented above indicate that, in spite of well-known difficult circumstances, UNSCOM and IAEA have been effective in uncovering and destroying many elements of Iraq's proscribed weapons programmes in accordance with the mandate provided by the Security Council. It is the panel's understanding that IAEA has been able to devise a technically coherent picture of Iraq's nuclear weapons programme. UNSCOM has achieved considerable progress in establishing material balances of Iraq's proscribed weapons. Although important elements still have to be resolved, the bulk of Iraq's proscribed weapons programmes has been eliminated.” (Amorim report, paragraph 25)

You write that you “do not believe, therefore, that the situation is quite as clear cut as would appear from the brief extract you quote from the Amorim document”. Clear cut or not, these are the conclusions of a UN commission in March 1999 and it is impossible to square them with John Simpson’s remarks that as the inspectors left “they suspected that Saddam had kept much of his deadly arsenal intact”.

Viewers would never guess from those remarks that UN inspectors had, for example:

• eliminated Iraq’s nuclear weapons programme (ibid, paragraph 14)

• destroyed Iraq’s chemical weapons production facilities plus 88,000 filled and unfilled munitions, over 600 tonnes of weaponised and bulk chemical agents, and some 4,000 tonnes of precursor chemicals (ibid, paragraph 19)

· destroyed Iraq’s biological weapons production facilities plus some 22 tonnes of growth media (ibid, paragraph 23)

(For a comprehensive account of the work of the IAEA, see for example report S/1997/779 of 8 October 1997 and other material on the IAEA website. Likewise for UNSCOM, see report S/1999/94 of 29 January 1999, where there is a complete inventory of the large quantities of chemical and biological weapons and weapons-related material and missiles destroyed by UNSCOM.)

It is true that significant quantities of chemical and biological weapons and weapons-related material were “unaccounted for” in December 1998 according to UNSCOM, that is, Iraq said it had destroyed them but was unable to convince UNSCOM that it had done so. As Hans Blix told the Security Council on 27 January this year – you quote him accurately on this point – that this does not necessarily mean that they exist.

Viewers would be hard pressed to deduce from John Simpson’s remarks on 9 March that UN inspectors believed there was a possibility that Iraq had no proscribed weapons at all.

A final point: John Simpson described these weapons as “deadly”. In fact, many of chemical and biological agents produced by Iraq degrade over time and would no longer be useful as warfare agents, even if they did exist.

In its dossier on Iraq’s proscribed weapons published last September, the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) comments on the possible deterioration of nerve agents manufactured prior to the Gulf War. Here, we are talking about so-called G-agents (tabun, sarin and cyclosarin) and V-agents (VX). The IISS assessment is as follows:

“As a practical matter, any nerve agent from this period [pre-1991] would have deteriorated by now …” (p51)

“Any VX produced by Iraq before 1991 is likely to have decomposed over the past decade …” (p52)

“Any G-agent or V-agent stocks that Iraq concealed from UNSCOM inspections are likely to have deteriorated by now.” (p53).

And as regards botulinum toxin, the IISS dossier said:

"Any botulinum toxin produced in 1989-90 would no longer be useful" (p40).

This is confirmed in the internal UNMOVIC document Unresolved Disarmament Issues published on 6 March this year for sarin (p73), VX (p82) and botulinum toxin (p101).

Viewers would be hard pressed to deduce from John Simpson’s remarks on 9 March that these agents would no longer be deadly, if they did exist.

Yours sincerely

David Morrison

Websites

The documents referenced can be found at one of the following websites:

UNSCOM: http://www.un.org/Depts/unscom

UNMOVIC: http://www.un.org/Depts/unmovic

IAEA: http//www.iaea.org

Annex A

Extracts from Amorim Report

(S/1999/356, dated 27 March 1999)

Nuclear weapons

“On the basis of its findings, the [International Atomic Energy] Agency is able to state that there is no indication that Iraq possesses nuclear weapons or any meaningful amounts of weapon-usable nuclear material or that Iraq has retained any practical capability (facilities or hardware) for the production of such material.” (paragraph 14)

Proscribed Missiles

“With regard to items selected as key for the purpose of the verification of the material balance of proscribed missiles and related operational assets, UNSCOM was able to destroy or otherwise account for: (a) 817 out of 819 imported operational missiles of proscribed range; (b) all declared mobile launchers for proscribed Al Hussein class missiles, including 14 operational launchers; the disposition of 9 of the 10 imported trailers used for the indigenous production of mobile launchers; and the destruction of 56 fixed missile launch sites; (c) 73 to 75 chemical and biological warheads of the declared 75 operational special warheads for Al Hussein class missiles; 83 of the 107 imported and some 80 of the 103 indigenously produced conventional warheads declared by Iraq to be in its possession at the time of the adoption of resolution 687.” (paragraph 16)

Chemical weapons and weapons-related material

“UNSCOM has supervised or been able to certify the destruction,, removal or rendering harmless of large quantities of chemical weapons (CW), their components and major chemical weapons production equipment as follows: (a) over 88,000 filled and unfilled chemical munitions; (b) over 600 tonnes of weaponized and bulk CW agents; (c) some 4,000 tonnes of precursor chemicals; (d) some 980 pieces of key production equipment; (e) some 300 pieces of analytical instruments.  The prime CW development and production complex in Iraq was dismantled and closed under UNSCOM supervision and other identified facilities have been put under monitoring.  It was pointed out that UNSCOM has been able to establish material balances of major weapon-related elements of Iraq's CW programme only on the basis of parameters as declared by Iraq but not fully verified by UNSCOM.” (paragraph 19)

Biological weapons and weapons-related material

“UNSCOM ordered and supervised the destruction of Iraq's main declared BW production and development facility, Al Hakam.  Some 60 pieces of equipment from three other facilities involved in proscribed BW activities as well as some 22 tonnes of growth media for BW production collected from four other facilities were also destroyed.  As a result, the declared facilities of Iraq's BW programme have been destroyed and rendered harmless.” (paragraph 23)

Conclusions

“The elements presented above indicate that, in spite of well-known difficult circumstances, UNSCOM and IAEA have been effective in uncovering and destroying many elements of Iraq's proscribed weapons programmes in accordance with the mandate provided by the Security Council.  It is the panel's understanding that IAEA has been able to devise a technically coherent picture of Iraq's nuclear weapons programme.  UNSCOM has achieved considerable progress in establishing material balances of Iraq's proscribed weapons.  Although important elements still have to be resolved, the bulk of Iraq's proscribed weapons programmes has been eliminated.” (paragraph 25)