Some facts about Iran’s nuclear
activities
by David Morrison
25 March 2012
Summary
“The United States,
European allies and even Israel
generally agree on three things about Iran's
nuclear program: Tehran
does not have a bomb, has not decided to build one, and is probably years away
from having a deliverable nuclear warhead.” (Reuters Special Report, 23 March
2012 [1])
- Iran has no nuclear weapons
- Iran has no nuclear weapons
programme
- Iran is not in breach of any
obligations under the NPT
- Uranium enrichment is Iran’s
“inalienable right” under the NPT
- The US
and its allies are trying to deny Iran its right to uranium
enrichment under the NPT
- Iran’s nuclear facilities are open
to IAEA inspection
- A double standard is being applied with regard to nuclear weapons
in the Middle East:-
(1) Iran,
which has none, is the object of ferocious economic sanctions and threats of
military action;
(2) Israel, which has
many (perhaps as many as 400) and the ability to deliver them to any capital
in the Middle East, is the object of over $3
billion a year of military aid.
- The US, Israel and others, who are threatening
military action against Iran,
are in breach of Article 2.4 of the UN Charter, which requires that all UN member
states “shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence
of any state”.
Iran hasn’t got a nuclear weapons programme
According to the US
intelligence services, Iran
hasn’t got a nuclear weapons programme, let alone a nuclear weapon [2].
That has been their consistent view since November 2007,
when they first published it in the National Intelligence Estimate Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities
[3]. This view has been reiterated every year
since then in reports to the US Congress by the US Director of National
Intelligence.
On 16 February this year, for example, giving evidence to
the Senate Armed Services Committee, the present Director, James Clapper, was
asked by the committee chairman, Senator Carl Levin, to confirm that in his
opinion Iran has not yet decided to develop nuclear weapons. The Director replied unequivocally: “That is
the intelligence community’s assessment” [4].
According to the US
intelligence services, the Israeli intelligence services “largely agree” with
their assessment of Iran’s
nuclear activities. The Director said so
in later evidence to the Committee [5].
A Reuters Special Report, dated 23 March 2012, entitled Intel[ligence] shows Iran nuclear
threat not imminent [1],
came to the following conclusions:
“The United States,
European allies and even Israel
generally agree on three things about Iran's
nuclear program: Tehran
does not have a bomb, has not decided to build one, and is probably years away
from having a deliverable nuclear warhead.”
The Report says that those
conclusions were “drawn from extensive interviews with current and former US
and European officials with access to intelligence on Iran” and “contrast
starkly with the heated debate surrounding a possible Israeli strike on
Tehran's nuclear facilities”. Indeed,
they do.
Iran is not in breach
of its obligations under the NPT
Iran is not in breach of its obligations
as a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) [6].
As a “non-nuclear-weapon” state party to the NPT, Iran is
obliged under Article II of the treaty “not to manufacture or otherwise acquire
nuclear weapons” – which it hasn’t done – and, under Article III, to subject
its nuclear facilities to IAEA inspection to ensure that nuclear material is
not diverted for the production of weapons – which it has done.
As regards the latter, Iran has declared to the IAEA 15
nuclear facilities, including its uranium enrichment plants at Natanz and
Fordow, and 9 other locations (LOFs) where nuclear material is customarily
used. All these sites are being
monitored by the IAEA. In his latest
report to the IAEA Board on 24 February 2012 [7],
the IAEA Director General confirmed for the umpteenth time that there was no
diversion of nuclear material from these facilities:
“…
the Agency continues to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material
at the nuclear facilities and LOFs declared by Iran under its Safeguards Agreement
…” (Paragraph 50)
Uranium enrichment is Iran’s
“inalienable right” as a party to the NPT
It must be emphasised that Iran is not breaching the NPT by
enriching uranium. On the contrary,
uranium enrichment for peaceful purposes is “the inalienable right” of all
parties to the NPT, Article IV(1) of which states:
“Nothing in this Treaty shall be
interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty
to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes
without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this
Treaty.” [6]
Argentina, Australia, Brazil,
Germany, Japan, Netherlands and South Korea, which like Iran are “non-nuclear-weapon” state
parties to the NPT, have uranium enrichment facilities (as have the 5 “nuclear-weapon” state parties to the NPT: China, France,
Russia, the UK and the US) [8].
Iran is not in breach of the NPT by
engaging in uranium enrichment, so long as this activity is under IAEA
supervision to ensure that no nuclear material is diverted for military
purposes. That is the case at Iran’s uranium enrichment plants at Natanz and
Fordow – and the IAEA has verifed that no material is being diverted and that
each facility is operating as declared by Iran in the relevant design
document.
In order to produce fissile material for a nuclear weapon,
uranium has to be enriched to over 90% U235.
At the moment, enrichment has not gone beyond the 20% figure, which is
required to fuel a research reactor in Tehran
(supplied to Iran by the US in the late
60s). This has been verified by the IAEA,
which in each of its reports on Iran’s
nuclear activity gives an inventory of the amounts of uranium enriched to 5%
and 20% at each facility (see, for example, paragraphs 10 to 27 of its latest
report [7]).
If Iran were to proceed to enrich uranium to a level above
20%, that is, towards the 90% level required to produce fissile material for a
nuclear weapon, this would be immediately apparent to the IAEA.
(Iran
would not be in breach of the NPT, even if it produced fissile material. The NPT requires “non-nuclear-state” parties “not
to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons”, but it doesn’t forbid the
acquisition of the materials, or the technical knowledge, required to
manufacture nuclear weapons).
The US and its allies are trying to deny Iran its right
to uranium enrichment
So, what’s the problem with Iran’s nuclear activities? Why are the US
and its allies imposing ferocious economic sanctions on Iran and are
contemplating a military assault on its nuclear facilities?
These days, the message from the US
and its allies is that Iran
is failing to meet unspecified international obligations. Speaking alongside President Obama at the
White House on 15 March 2012, British Prime Minister, David Cameron, put it
this way:
“We also discussed the continuing
threat posed by Iran’s
failure to meet its international obligations. On this, we are fully
united. We are determined to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear
weapon. We believe there is still time and space to pursue a diplomatic
solution and we are going to keep coordinating closely with our P5+1
partners. At the same time, we are going to keep up the pressure with the
strongest US
sanctions to date and the European Union preparing to impose an embargo on
Iranian oil. Tehran
must understand that it cannot escape or evade the choice before it: meet your
international obligations or face the consequences.” [9]
But, if the US
intelligence services are to be believed, Iran hasn’t got a nuclear weapon,
or even a programme to develop nuclear weapons.
And its nuclear facilities are being monitored by the IAEA as required
by the NPT. So, how can there be a
“continuing threat posed by Iran’s
failure to meet its international obligations”?
What are the “international obligations” which Iran’s failure
to meet warrants ferocious economic sanctions and possible military attack?
These days, the US and it allies rarely specify the
“international obligations” that Iran is evading, understandably so,
because they are obligations that no other state in this world is being asked
to fulfil.
First and foremost, as we will see below, Iran is being
asked to cease uranium enrichment on its own soil and cease it permanently. This is a transparent attempt to deny Iran its “inalienable
right” under Article IV(1) of the NPT “to develop research, production and use
of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination”. It demands that Iran accept permanent treatment as
a second-class party to the NPT, with fewer rights than all other parties.
That is why, despite having to endure economic sanctions of
increasing severity and being threatened with military attack, Iran continues to refuse to meet what the US and its
allies term “international obligations”.
The UK, France
and Germany proposed that Iran cease
enrichment permanently
A little bit of history.
In October 2003, the Foreign Ministers of the UK,
France and Germany visited Tehran
and initiated discussions with Iran
on a broad range of issues, including its nuclear programme. In a statement issued with Iran at the
time, the three EU states said:
“Their governments recognise the
right of Iran
to enjoy peaceful use of nuclear energy in accordance with the NPT.” [10]
This was a clear statement that these EU states accepted
that Iran
had a right to uranium enrichment on its own soil like other parties to the
NPT. This clear statement was repeated
in the later Paris Agreement signed by Iran and the
three EU states (aka E3/EU) on 15 November 2004 [11],
which said:
“The E3/EU recognise Iran's rights
under the NPT exercised in conformity with its obligations under the Treaty,
without discrimination.”
The Paris Agreement set the scene for negotiations between
the E3/EU and Iran,
which were supposed to lead to a long term comprehensive agreement.
In the Paris Agreement, Iran agreed “on a voluntary basis”
to suspend “all enrichment related and reprocessing activities”. In turn, the E3/EU recognized that “this
suspension is a voluntary confidence building measure and not a legal
obligation”.
The final agreement was supposed to “provide objective
guarantees that Iran's nuclear programme is exclusively for peaceful purposes”,
that is, arrangements over and above the requirements of the NPT for monitoring
Iran’s nuclear activities so as to give confidence to the outside world that
they are not for military purposes.
The UK, France and Germany published proposals for a
final agreement on 5 August 2005 [12]. These demanded that Iran make “a
binding commitment not to pursue fuel cycle activities other than the
construction and operation of light water power and research reactors”, in
other words, all enrichment and related activities on Iranian soil had to cease
for good. Iran was required to make permanent
its voluntary suspension of these activities.
The UK, France and Germany
had negotiated in bad faith and broken their commitment at the outset to
“recognise the right of Iran
to enjoy peaceful use of nuclear energy in accordance with the NPT”. Iran was to be the only party to
the NPT that was forbidden to have uranium enrichment on its own soil.
The EU states made no attempt to devise “objective
guarantees that Iran's
nuclear programme is exclusively for peaceful purposes”, as required by the
Paris Agreement. In the course of the
negotiations, Iran
made a number of proposals in this regard [13], for example,
- immediate
conversion of all enriched uranium to fuel rods to preclude the
possibility of further enrichment
- continuous
on-site presence of IAEA inspectors at the conversion and enrichment
facilities to provide unprecedented added guarantees.
Iran also suggested that the IAEA be
asked to devise appropriate “objective guarantees”. All of these suggestions were ignored by the
EU states.
In a speech at the UN on 17 September 2005, President
Ahmadinejad made a further proposal:
“As a further confidence building
measure and in order to provide the greatest degree of transparency, the
Islamic Republic of Iran is prepared to engage in serious partnership with
private and public sectors of other countries in the implementation of uranium
enrichment program in Iran.
This represents the most far reaching step, outside all requirements of the
NPT, being proposed by Iran
as a further confidence building measure.” [14]
This offer by Iran to have its enrichment
programme managed by an international consortium was also ignored. US Under Secretary of State, Nicholas Burns, went
so far as to describe Ahmadinejad’s speech as “excessively harsh and
uncompromising” [15].
The EU states (and the US)
were not interested in “objective guarantees that Iran’s nuclear programme is
exclusively for peaceful purposes”.
Their goal was to halt permanently the core elements of the programme –
uranium enrichment and related activities.
Peter Jenkins confirms
that the “objective was to put a stop to all enrichment in Iran”
That this was the goal of the US
and its allies in 2005 was confirmed recently by Peter Jenkins, who was the UK Ambassador
to the IAEA from 2001 and 2006 and was involved in these negotiations. Looking back, he regrets that Iran’s offer of
additional safeguards was not taken up.
Writing in the Daily Telegraph on 23 January 2012, he said:
“My hunch is that this gathering
crisis could be avoided by a deal along the following lines: Iran would
accept top-notch IAEA safeguards in return for being allowed to continue
enriching uranium. In addition, Iran
would volunteer some confidence-building measures to show that it has no
intention of making nuclear weapons.
“This, essentially, is the deal that
Iran offered the UK, France
and Germany
in 2005. With hindsight, that offer should have been snapped up. It wasn’t,
because our objective was to put a stop to all enrichment in Iran. That has
remained the West’s aim ever since, despite countless Iranian reminders that
they are unwilling to be treated as a second-class party to the NPT – with
fewer rights than other signatories – and despite all the evidence that the
Iranian character is more inclined to defiance than buckling under pressure.
“But that missed opportunity need
not prove lethal if the West can pull back now and join the rest of the world
in seeing an agreement of this kind as the prudent way forward.” [16]
This is persuasive evidence that the obstacle to a
settlement with Iran on the
nuclear issue at that time was the refusal of the US
and its allies to recognise Iran’s
right under the NPT to uranium enrichment on its own soil.
There is no reason to believe that this policy has changed.
Iran referred to the Security Council and sanctioned
Understandably, Iran
rejected the August 2005 proposals from the UK,
France and Germany and
over the next six months or so resumed the various activities which it had
voluntarily suspended during the negotiations.
As a result, the US and its allies persuaded the IAEA Board to pass a
resolution on 4 February 2006 [17]
demanding, inter alia, that Iran “re-establish full and sustained
suspension of all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including
research and development” and referring the matter to the Security Council.
Subsequently, the Security Council passed a series of resolutions
demanding that Iran
cease uranium enrichment, amongst other things.
Four of these resolutions included tranches of economic sanctions
against Iran.
These UN-approved sanctions were relatively mild. However, in December 2011, legislation was
passed by the US Congress at the behest of the Israeli lobby (and accepted by
President Obama, who dare not offend the Israeli lobby), which may do
significant damage to the Iranian economy.
The legislation requires the Obama administration to bully other
states around the world to stop trading with Iran, specifically, to stop buying
Iranian oil, by threatening to cut off foreign financial institutions from the
US financial system, if they conduct transactions with the Central Bank of Iran
or other Iranian financial institutions.
(Whatever happened to the US commitment to free trade?) Its own trade with Iran will be unaffected since it
has been negligible since the Islamic Revolution in 1979.
The EU has meekly followed the US
lead, even though this may be economically painful for some EU states (eg Greece and Italy)
who get a significant amount of their oil requirements from Iran.
On 20 March 2012, the US
graciously conceded that the financial institutions in 11 states would, for the
next 180 days at least, be exempt from US sanctions, because they had obeyed Washington’s edict. In a
statement, Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, said:
“I am pleased to announce that an
initial group of eleven countries has significantly reduced their volume of
crude oil purchases from Iran
– Belgium, the Czech Republic, France,
Germany, Greece, Italy,
Japan, the Netherlands, Poland,
Spain, and the United Kingdom.
As a result, I will report to the Congress that sanctions pursuant to Section
1245 of the National Defense Authorization Act for 2012 (NDAA) will not apply
to the financial institutions based in these countries, for a renewable period
of 180 days.” [18]
The degree to which this US bullying will succeed remains to
be seen. For instance, will China reduce its substantial oil purchases from Iran? And, if it refuses to do so, will the US cut off
Chinese financial institutions from the US financial system – which has the
potential for disrupting trade between the US and China?
Iran & Israel: applying
a double standard
What a
strange world we live in? The US and its allies, which claim they want to see
the Middle East free from nuclear weapons, are applying ferocious economic
sanctions, and threatening military action, against Iran, which hasn’t got a single
nuclear weapon – and its nuclear facilities are open to IAEA inspection.
However,
they are utterly opposed to applying any sanctions to Israel, despite its
possession of perhaps as many as 400 nuclear warheads with the ability to deliver them by
aircraft, ballistic missile and submarine-launched cruise missiles
and wipe any capital in the Middle East (and probably much further afield) off
the map – and its nuclear facilities are almost entirely closed to the IAEA.
Far from
sanctioning Israel, the US gives it
over US$3 billion a year in military aid and, despite an enormous budget
deficit, the amount has increased every year under the Obama administration, as
the President was at pains to emphasise in his speech to AIPAC on 4 March 2012 [19]. More US
tax dollars go to Israel
than to any other state in this world.
One could be forgiven for thinking that a double standard is
being applied to Iran and Israel in this
regard.
The US
and its allies frequently say that, if Iran
acquires nuclear weapons, this would inevitably lead to widespread proliferation
of nuclear weapons in the Middle East. That, they say, is one of the reasons why Iran must not
be allowed to acquire them.
What is rarely mentioned is that, because of Israel’s acquisition of nuclear weapons, Iran and other states in the region would at
this moment be within their rights to withdraw from the NPT and develop nuclear
weapons as Israel,
which never joined the NPT, has done, without breaching any international
obligations.
Article IX of
the NPT says:
“Each
Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw
from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject
matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country.
It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and
to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice
shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having
jeopardized its supreme interests.” [6]
By any
objective standard, Iran and
other states in the region have good grounds for withdrawal, because, since
they signed the NPT, Israel
has acquired a large nuclear arsenal, which is sure to be targeted on
them. There could hardly be a better example of “extraordinary events,
related to the subject matter of this Treaty”, which “have jeopardized [their]
supreme interests”.
It might not
be wise for Iran or other states in the region to withdraw from the NPT at the
present time but there is no doubt that such an action would be within Article
IX of the NPT.
(Saudi Arabia
is usually mentioned as being certain to acquire nuclear weapons, if Iran does
so. In this context, it is worth drawing
attention to remarks by Jack Straw, the former British Foreign Minister, in the
House of Commons on 20 February 2012 [20]. He questioned whether there would be a race
for nuclear capability in the region and quoted a senior Saudi diplomat who
told him: “I know what we’re saying publicly, but do you really think that
having told people that there is no need for us to make any direct response to
Israel holding nuclear weapons, we could seriously make a case for developing a
nuclear weapons capability to deal with another Muslim country?”)
On breaching
“international obligations”
The US
and its allies are forever lecturing other states about living up to their “international
obligations”.
The UN Charter contains a set of international obligations,
which all UN members are supposed to fulfil.
The most fundamental of all is in Article 2.4, which requires that all
UN member states “shall refrain in their international relations from the
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state” [21].
By threatening military action against Iran, the US
and Israel and other states
(including the UK)
are in flagrant and continuous breach of Article 2.4.
The US
and Israel
should be expelled from the UN under Article 6 of the Charter, which provides
for the expulsion of a member which “has persistently violated the Principles
contained in the present Charter”.
That’s not going to happen, of course, since the US is a
veto-wielding member of the Security Council (which must recommend any expulsion)
and the other is its close ally.
That’s the way the UN system works, or rather doesn’t.
David Morrison
25 March 2012
References:
[1] uk.reuters.com\article\2012\03\23\uk-iran-usa-nuclear-idUKBRE82M0GI20120323
[2] www.david-morrison.org.uk/iran/iran-no-nuclear-programme.htm
[3] www.dni.gov/press_releases/20071203_release.pdf
[4] c-spanvideo.org/program/ThreatstoUSN (39 minutes in)
[5] c-spanvideo.org/program/ThreatstoUSN (96 minutes in)
[6] www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc140.pdf
[7] www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2012/gov2012-9.pdf
[8] www.ieer.org/reports/uranium/enrichment.pdf
[9] www.number10.gov.uk/news/press-conference-by-david-cameron-and-barack-obama/
[10] www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/iaeairan/statement_iran21102003.shtml
[11] www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2004/infcirc637.pdf
[12] www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2005/infcirc651.pdf
[13] www.payvand.com/news/05/nov/1211.html
[14] www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/iran/2005/iran-050918-irna02.htm
[15] www.nytimes.com/2005/09/27/politics/27assess.html
[16] www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iran/9033566/The-deal-the-West-could-strike-with-Iran.html
[17] www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2006/gov2006-14.pdf
[18] www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2012/03/186086.htm
[19] www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/03/04/remarks-president-aipac-policy-conference-0
[20] www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201212/cmhansrd/cm120220/debtext/120220-0002.htm
[21] www.un.org/en/documents/charter/