Iran hasn’t a nuclear weapons programme
says US
intelligence
Iran hasn’t got
an active nuclear weapons programme today. That is the considered opinion of US intelligence in a National Intelligence
Estimate (NIE) on Iran’s
“nuclear intentions and capabilities”, the key judgments of which were
published in December 2007 [1].
The NIE’s principal
conclusion was that Iran
halted its nuclear weapons programme in the autumn of
2003 and hasn’t restarted its programme since.
This differs markedly from a US intelligence assessment of May 2005, which judged that “Iran currently
is determined to develop nuclear weapons despite its international obligations
and international pressure”.
The
US administration’s reaction to this dramatic shift has been to say that
nothing much has changed, that Iran may not have an active nuclear weapons
programme any more, but it has the knowledge to make nuclear weapons, in
particular, it knows how to enrich uranium.
However,
try as he might, President Bush will have difficulty convincing the world that
an Iran that halted a
nuclear weapons programme four years ago is as threatening as an Iran with an active nuclear weapons programme
today – which was the previous story from US intelligence.
What the IAEA has found
It must be
emphasised that the IAEA has found no evidence that Iran ever had a
nuclear weapons programme. The IAEA’s Director
General, Dr Mohamed ElBaradei, was interviewed by
Wolf Blitzer on CNN on 28 October 2007.
Blitzer asked:
“Do
you believe there is a clandestine, secret nuclear weapons program right now
under way in Iran?”
[2]
ElBaradei
replied:
“We
haven’t seen any concrete evidence to that effect, Wolf. We haven’t received
any information there is a parallel ongoing, active nuclear weapon program.
Later in
the interview he said:
“But
have we seen Iran
having the nuclear material that can readily be used into a weapon? No. Have we
seen an active weaponization program? No.”
An IAEA
statement on 4 December 2007 in response to the NIE said:
“IAEA
Director General Mohamed ElBaradei received with
great interest the new U.S. National Intelligence Estimate about Iran’s nuclear program which concludes that
there has been no on-going nuclear weapons program in Iran since the
fall of 2003. He notes in particular that the Estimate tallies with the Agency´s consistent statements over the last few years
that, although Iran still
needs to clarify some important aspects of its past and present nuclear
activities, the Agency has no concrete evidence of an ongoing nuclear weapons
program or undeclared nuclear facilities in Iran.” [3]
It should
be emphasised that the IAEA has found no evidence of
an earlier programme either.
Of course,
Iran has uranium conversion
and enrichment facilities (at Isfahan and Natanz). This is Iran’s right as a signatory to the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) so long as these facilities are for
peaceful purposes and are under IAEA supervision. Remember, Article IV(1)
of the Treaty states:
“Nothing
in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all
the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear
energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with
Articles I and II of this Treaty.” [4]
These
facilities could, in principle, be used to produce highly enriched uranium
suitable for nuclear weapons. But these,
and other, nuclear facilities in Iran are subject to IAEA
monitoring. Central to this monitoring
is the tracking of nuclear material through Iran’s nuclear facilities to make
sure that none is diverted, possibly for military purposes. Dr ElBaradei’s
latest report (15 November 2007) concluded:
“The
Agency has been able to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material
in Iran.
Iran
has provided the Agency with access to declared nuclear material, and has
provided the required nuclear material accountancy reports in connection with
declared nuclear material and activities.” (paragraph
39) [5]
In other
words, no nuclear material has gone missing in the course of processing through
the nuclear facilities declared by Iran to the IAEA.
What is
more, the highest enrichment level detected by the IAEA in the Fuel Enrichment
Plant at Natanz is about 4% (see paragraph 21 of Dr ElBaradei’s latest report), which is consistent with the
relatively low level of enrichment required for reactor fuel. An enrichment level of 90% or more is needed
for weapons grade uranium.
Covert
programme
According to the NIE, the “nuclear
weapons programme” that Iran was allegedly operating until the autumn of 2003
did not involve the overt uranium conversion and enrichment facilities at Istfahan and Natanz. In a footnote, it says:
“For the purposes of this
Estimate, by ‘nuclear weapons program’ we mean Iran’s
nuclear weapon design and weaponization work and
covert uranium conversion-related and uranium enrichment-related work; we do
not mean Iran’s
declared civil work related to uranium conversion and enrichment.”
So, according to the NIE, up to the
autumn of 2003, Iran
was engaged in covert uranium conversion and enrichment activities for weapons
purposes that it didn’t declare to the IAEA – in addition to the declared activities
at Istfahan and Natanz.
It follows from this that halting Iran’s declared uranium conversion and
enrichment activities would not have halted Iran’s nuclear weapons
programme. Yet, the US has led the way
over recent years in demanding that Iran halt its declared uranium conversion
and enrichment activity and has persuaded the Security Council to support this
demand and to impose economic sanctions on Iran in order to persuade Iran to
comply. This makes no sense.
Leave the
NPT
It is
conceivable that Iran
had a weapons programme in the past (though the IAEA
has found no evidence of this). It is
also conceivable that at some time in the future Iran will withdraw from the NPT. In that event, like Israel, India
and Pakistan
that have never signed the NPT, it would not be breaking any international
treaty obligations by developing nuclear weapons. Like Israel,
India and Pakistan, it
would not be obliged by international treaty to declare its nuclear facilities
to the IAEA. Like Israel, India
and Pakistan,
it would be free to engage in whatever nuclear activities it wished free from
the prying eyes of the IAEA. Then, for
example, it could adapt its facilities at Natanz to
enrich uranium to weapons grade without breaking any international treaty
obligations.
By any
objective standard, Iran
would be within its rights under the NPT to withdraw from the NPT – because,
since it signed the Treaty in 1968, Israel
(and Pakistan and India) have
acquired nuclear weapons. Article IX of
the Treaty states:
“Each
Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to
withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to
the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its
country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the
Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such
notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as
having jeopardized its supreme interests.” [4]
There
could hardly be a better example of “extraordinary events, related to the
subject matter of this Treaty”, which have jeopardized Iran’s supreme
interests, than the fact that it is now a target for Israeli nuclear weapons –
which it wasn’t in 1968 when it signed the Treaty.
Obviously,
for Iran to withdraw from
the NPT any time soon, with the clear implication that it intended to develop
nuclear weapons, would risk terrible havoc from the US
and/or Israel.
The only sensible course of action for Iran,
or any other non-nuclear state that wishes to develop nuclear weapons, is to do
it secretly and, like India
and Pakistan,
make an announcement about it only after success has been achieved – and
retribution by other nuclear states is impossible.
UK example
If Iran is seeking a respectable reason for
acquiring nuclear weapons, it could do worse than read the British Government’s
White Paper The Future of the United Kingdom's Nuclear Deterrent,
published in December 2006, paragraph 3-4 of which states that Britain must
have nuclear weapons
“to deter and prevent nuclear blackmail and acts of
aggression against our vital interests that cannot be countered by other
means.” [6]
If Britain has to have nuclear weapons when no
state is threatening it, how can Britain
argue against Iran acquiring
them, when the US and Israel
threaten military action against it every day in life?
David Morrison
10 January 2008
www.david-morrison.org.uk
References:
[1] www.dni.gov/press_releases/20071203_release.pdf
[2] edition.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0710/28/le.01.html
[3] www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/PressReleases/2007/prn200722.html
[4] www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc140.pdf
[5] www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2007/gov2007-58.pdf
[6] www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/AC00DD79-76D6-4FE3-91A1-6A56B03C092F/0/
DefenceWhitePaper2006_Cm6994.pdf