The EU “forgets” about Georgia and makes up with Russia
On 2 December 2008, the EU resumed negotiations with Russia about a new
partnership agreement [1]. Negotiations had been postponed on 1
September 2008 in the wake of Russia’s
military action in Georgia
in August.
The negotiations were resumed without a fanfare, in
marked contrast to the hullabaloo that surrounded their postponement three
months earlier. Vladimir
Chizhov, the Russian Ambassador to the EU,
met the European Commission’s lead negotiator, Eneko Landaburu, for two
hours in Brussels. There was no press conference afterwards.
British Foreign Secretary, David Miliband, who in August was
the leading advocate of the EU taking a hard line against Russia, and of
the postponement of the negotiations, was absolutely silent about their
resumption. Understandably so, since the
EU has resumed negotiations, even though the condition laid down by the EU for
their resumption – that Russia
withdraw its troops to their positions prior to the outbreak of hostilities –
hasn’t been fulfilled.
EU foreign ministers made the decision to resume
negotiations on 10 November 2008 [2]. Prior to the meeting, Miliband issued a joint
statement with Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Carl Bildt, saying:
“… we are deeply concerned that Russia
has not yet withdrawn to its pre 7 August positions as the EU has made clear
that it must. We therefore urge Russia
to fully implement both the 12 August and 8 September EU brokered peace
agreements. We are also concerned that OSCE as well as EU monitors have still
been prevented from entering South Ossetia.” [3]
Despite all this, Miliband didn’t oppose resumption on
behalf of Britain. Miliband the mouth has become Miliband the
mouse.
The only state that held out against resumption was Lithuania, but
the resumption didn’t require unanimity amongst member states (apparently
because the negotiations were not suspended last September, merely postponed).
EU External Relations Commissioner, Benita Ferrero-Waldner,
made a lame attempt to counter the assumption that the EU had climbed down:
"This does not mean that we are giving a
gift to Russia
and this does not mean that we are changing our very firm position on the
events of the summer. Russia’s action over Georgia remains unacceptable.” [2]
In reality, the EU has
now terminated its very mild sanction against Russia for this action.
Much more important, the
EU has accepted the result of that action, which is that South Ossetia and
Abkhazia are no longer part of Georgia
in any meaningful sense, and won’t be for the foreseeable future. The EU may not have recognized them as
independent states, as Russia
has done, but it has abandoned any challenge to Russia’s
insistence, backed up with Russian military force, that they are not going to
be governed from Tbilisi.
Negotiations postponed
An extraordinary meeting of the European Council on
1 September 2008, called to consider events in Georgia,
took the decision to postpone the scheduled negotiations on a partnership
agreement with Russia. The Council conclusions stated:
“Until [Russian] troops have
withdrawn to the positions held prior to 7 August, meetings on the negotiation
of the Partnership Agreement will be postponed.” [4]
Russia withdrew
its troops from Georgia
outside South Ossetia and Abkazia. However, Russia
stated plainly from the outset that it intended to keep thousands of troops in South Ossetia and Abkhazia for the foreseeable
future. On 8 September 2008, the Russian
Defence Minister, Anatoly Serdyukov, said that 3,800 troops would be stationed
in each area [5]. That is a great deal more than the number
deployed prior to 7 August 2008, when it is generally believed there were about
1,000 troops under Russian command in South Ossetia
and 2,500 in Abkhazia.
So, there isn’t the slightest
doubt that Russian troops haven’t been withdrawn to their positions prior to 7
August 2008. Nevertheless, the EU has resumed
negotiations with Russia.
EU Monitoring Mission
As president of the EU, President
Sarkozy brokered a ceasefire between Russia
and Georgia
on 12 August 2008. The text of the
ceasefire agreement (given in a press release from an EU foreign ministers
meeting the next day [6]
(p 6-7)) consists of a set of principles and is very imprecise. On the withdrawal of Russian troops, the
agreement says:
“Russian
military forces will have to withdraw to the lines held prior to the outbreak
of hostilities. Pending an international mechanism, Russian peace-keeping
forces will implement additional security measures;” (point 5)
In the first sentence, Russia signed
up to withdrawing its forces to the positions held prior to 7 August – eventually. The second sentence allowed Russia to keep troops inside Georgia proper on the borders of South Ossetia and Abkhazia until an international
monitoring mechanism was in place.
On 8 September 2008, President
Sarkozy went back to Moscow, and then to Tbilisi, to make
arrangements for the implementation of the agreement of 12 August (see [7]
for the text of what was agreed). Part
of these arrangements was:
“the deployment of additional
observers in the areas adjacent to South Ossetia and Abkhazia in sufficient
numbers to replace the Russian peacekeeping [sic] forces by 1 October 2008,
including at least 200 European Union observers.”
The EU observers, aka the European
Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM Georgia), were deployed as arranged
by 1 October 2008 and Russian troops withdrew into South
Ossetia and Abkhazia, more or less.
(It was also agreed that UN and
OSCE international monitors would continue to be deployed within Abkhazia and South Ossetia respectively, as they were prior to the
outbreak of hostilities. Russia insisted on monitors in Georgia proper, and insisted that they came from
the EU, because, since Georgia
is keen to join the EU, the presence of EU monitors is likely to restrain it
from repeating its aggression of 7 August.)
The agreement with Russia provided for the deployment of EU
observers “in the areas
adjacent to South Ossetia and Abkhazia”, but not within these areas – which
implied that the EU accepted that these areas were no longer really part of Georgia. However, in order to sell the agreement In
Tbilisi, Sarkozy gave the false impression that Russia
had agreed to their deployment inside South Ossetia and Abkhazia, saying as he stood alongside Georgian
President Saakashvili:
“The spirit of the text is that they
(the EU observers) will have a mandate to enter (Abkhazia and South
Ossetia), to observe, to report.” [8]
This produced a fierce response from Moscow, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov saying:
“This is an absolutely immoral
attempt to explain dishonestly to Mr Saakashvili what obligations were taken on
by the European Union and what obligations by Russia. Additional international observers will be
deployed precisely around South Ossetia and
Abkhazia and not inside these republics.” [8]
Nevertheless, the EU legislation specifying the mandate for EUMM Georgia (Council Joint Action 2008/736/CFSP of 15 September 2008 [9]) describes its area of operation as Georgia without mentioning South
Ossetia and Abkhazia, so it meant to include them. A statement from the head of the mission,
Hansjörg Haber, on 4 November 2008 underlined this, saying:
“EUMM has
a Georgia-wide mandate, thus including Abkhazia and South
Ossetia. We are here to observe compliance with the peace
agreements of 12 August and 8 September by all sides, contribute to
stabilisation and normalisation of the situation on the ground and help
confidence-building.
“However,
EUMM is a civilian and unarmed mission. We cannot and we do not want to force
our way. We can only go where there is cooperation. It is the task of our
monitors to knock on the doors and request access to Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Therefore, our patrols approach the
Russian, Abkhaz and South Ossetian checkpoints along the administrative
boundary line. We approach the staff of the checkpoints in a friendly manner,
try to establish contacts and explain our mandate. We will continue this
confidence-building work.” [10]
Up to now, in line with the
arrangements made with Sarkozy in Moscow on 12
September 2008, Russia has
refused to allow EU observers into South Ossetia
and Abkhazia (see interview with Hansjörg Haber on 27 March 2009 [11])
By having EU monitors seek access
South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the EU is expressing its formal position that Georgia includes South
Ossetia and Abkhazia. By
refusing to make an issue of Russia’s
refusal to grant them access, the EU is accepting the reality that they are now
separate entities under Russian protection.
NATO
2 December 2008 was a very good day for Russia. Not only did the EU resume negotiations with
it on a partnership agreement, but, a few hours later in another part of Brussels, NATO foreign ministers decided to resume contact
with Russia
within the NATO-Russia Council. Miliband
the mouth was party to this decision as well, as was US Secretary of State, Condoleezza
Rice.
Contact with Russia
within the NATO-Russia Council had been broken off in August. A special NATO foreign ministers meeting on
19 August 2008 concluded:
“In 2002, we established the NATO-Russia
Council, a framework for discussions with Russia,
including on issues that divide the Alliance and
Russia. We have determined that we cannot continue
with business as usual.” [12]
But on 2 December 2008, NATO reversed gear. True, in the communiqué at the end of the
meeting [13], NATO condemned
Russia for its “disproportionate
military actions during the conflict with Georgia
in August” and for its “subsequent recognition of the South Ossetia and
Abkhazia regions of Georgia,
which we condemn and call upon Russia
to reverse”. In addition, NATO demanded
that Russia “implement fully
the commitments agreed with Georgia,
as mediated by the EU on 12 August and 8 September 2008” and allow “full access
by international monitors”.
Nevertheless, the foreign ministers
“mandated the Secretary General [of
NATO] to re-engage with Russia
at the political level; agreed to informal discussions in the NRC [NATO-Russia
Council]; and requested the Secretary General to report back to us prior to any
decision to engage Russia
formally in the NRC.”
Neither Rice nor Miliband opposed this resumption of
relations with Russia.
Neither Rice nor Miliband pressed for Membership Action
Plans (MAPs) for Georgia and
the Ukraine
either.
On 3 April 2008, at a heads of state meeting in Bucharest, NATO had decided in principle to allow Ukraine and Georgia to become full members. But, Germany, France
and other states successfully resisted intense pressure from the US (with the support of the UK) to draw up MAPs for Ukraine and Georgia right away.
The foreign ministers’ communiqué on 2 December 2008 reaffirmed
“all elements of the decisions regarding Ukraine
and Georgia taken by our
Heads of State and Government in Bucharest”. But, the US
and the UK
didn’t press for MAPs this time, presumably because they knew that they weren’t
going to succeed. It looks as if NATO’s
eastward march is an end.
President Sarkozy’s role
When President Sarkozy came to
power, he sounded as if he was going to be much more pro-American than his
predecessors. But, in his dealings with Russia in the aftermath of the hostilities in Georgia, he sidelined the US and placed
the EU centre stage. It is impossible to
believe that this would have happened had any state other than France happened
to hold the EU presidency at the time.
It is also impossible to believe that all other EU states were happy
with Sarkozy’s sidelining of the US
– for example, Britain and
the former Soviet bloc states, which have welcomed the exercise of US
power in eastern Europe since the end of the Cold War.
What’s the evidence for this? First, Sarkozy’s first trip to Moscow on 12 August 2008 to broker a ceasefire was opposed
by the US. He said so, when he addressed the European
Parliament as President of the European Council on 21 October 2008 [14]. Without directly naming the US (or the UK), he also said that “some were
saying” that dialogue was useless and there had to be a military response
(which he described as “madness”).
Here’s the passage on Georgia from
his speech:
“We [the French presidency] wanted
this Europe first of all to be united – which wasn’t that simple -, to think
independently – because the world needs Europe
to think independently – and be proactive. If Europe
has things to say, it must not just say them, it must do them. First of all we
had the war, with the Russians’ wholly disproportionate reaction in the
Georgian conflict. I use the words advisedly. I say ‘disproportionate’ because
it is disproportionate to intervene as the Russians intervened in Georgia. But I
use the word ‘reaction’ because while the reaction was disproportionate, there
had been a wholly inappropriate action before. Europe
must be fair and not hesitate to break out of ideological mindsets to promote a
message of peace.
On 8 August, the crisis erupted. On
12 August Bernard Kouchner and I were in Moscow
to obtain the ceasefire. I’m not saying what was done was perfect, I’m simply
saying that in four days Europe got a
ceasefire. And at the beginning of September, Europe
got the commitment to a withdrawal to the pre-8 August positions. In two
months, Europe obtained the end of a war and
withdrawal of the occupation troops. There were several possibilities. Some were saying – and they had reasons for
doing so – that dialogue was useless and that the response to the military
action had to be military: madness! Europe has
seen the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War. Europe
must not be an accessory to a new cold war, entered solely because people lost
their cool.
“This was
a problem we overcame with our American allies, who thought that the visit to Moscow wasn’t timely.
Despite everything, we acted hand in hand with our American allies. They had a
position which wasn’t the same as ours. We tried to build collaboration rather
than opposition. And frankly, given the state of the world today, I don’t think
it needs a crisis between Europe and Russia. That would be
irresponsible. We can therefore defend our ideas on respect for sovereignty, on
respect for Georgia’s
integrity, on human rights and on our differences with those who govern Russia. But it
would have been irresponsible to create the conditions for a clash we
absolutely didn’t need. The discussions have begun in Geneva
on the future status of the Georgian territories of South
Ossetia and Abkhazia. I’m told they’ve got off to a difficult
start. Who could imagine it being any other way? But what’s important is that
they are starting. I have to say, moreover, that President Medvedev has
honoured the commitments he made before the Commission and European Council
presidencies when we went to Moscow
at the beginning of September.
“Europe has brought peace. Europe obtained the withdrawal
of an occupation army and Europe wanted the
international discussions. It seems to me that it’s been a long time since Europe has played such a role in a conflict of this kind.
I can of course see all the ambiguities, all the inadequacies, all the
compromises it’s been necessary to make, but in all conscience I think we have
obtained the maximum of what was possible, and, above all, President [of the
Parliament] Pöttering, if Europe hadn’t made the voice of dialogue and reason
heard, who would have made it heard? When Bernard Kouchner and I left on 12
August for Moscow and Tbilisi,
all the world media were well aware that the Russians were 40 km from Tbilisi and the goal was
to topple Mr Saakashvili’s regime. That was the reality. We were very close to
disaster but thanks to Europe, a determined Europe, there was no disaster, even
though, President Pöttering, there will, of course, be a long way to go before
tensions calm down in that part of the world.”
Needless to say, Sarkozy was not
in the business of minimising his achievements as the holder of the EU
presidency, nor of the degree to which Russia shifted ground due to his
intervention on behalf of the EU. In
reality, Russia got what it
wanted – South Ossetia and Abkhazia as separate entities under Russian military
protection and unlikely to be ruled from Tbilisi
ever again.
David Morrison
5 April 2009
www.david-morrison.com
References:
[1] www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/1228249921.6
[2] www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/eu-overrules-lithuania-russia-talks/article-177071
[3] www.fco.gov.uk/en/newsroom/latest-news/?view=PressR&id=8975097
[4] www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/102545.pdf
[5] news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/7606072.stm
[6] www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/IMG/pdf/General_Affairs_and_External_Relations_meeting
_August_20008.pdf
[7]
pastel.diplomatie.gouv.fr/editorial/actual/ael2/bulletin.gb.asp?liste=20080909.gb.html
[8] www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/1221053525.22/
[9] eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:248:0026:01:EN:HTML
[10] consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/081105-HoM_on_ABK.pdf
[11] www.eumm.eu/en/press_and_public_information/features/1170
[12] www.nato.int/docu/pr/2008/p08-104e.html
[13] www.nato.int/docu/pr/2008/p08-153e.html
[14] www.france-in-india.org/en/article.php3?id_article=3361