The EU “forgets” about Georgia and makes up with Russia
On
2 December 2008, the EU resumed negotiations with Russia about a new partnership
agreement [1]. Negotiations had been postponed on 1
September 2008 in the wake of Russia’s
military action in Georgia
in August.
The negotiations were resumed
without a fanfare, in marked contrast to the hullabaloo that surrounded their
postponement three months earlier. Vladimir Chizhov, the Russian Ambassador
to the EU, met the European Commission’s lead negotiator, Eneko
Landaburu, for two hours in Brussels. There was no press conference afterwards.
British Foreign Secretary, David
Miliband, who in August was the leading advocate of the EU taking a hard line
against Russia,
and of the postponement of the negotiations, was absolutely silent about their
resumption. Understandably so, since the
EU has resumed negotiations, even though the condition laid down by the EU for
their resumption – that Russia
withdraw its troops to their positions prior to the outbreak of hostilities –
hasn’t been fulfilled.
EU foreign ministers made the
decision to resume negotiations on 10 November 2008 [2]. Prior to the meeting, Miliband issued a joint
statement with Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Carl Bildt, saying:
“… we are deeply
concerned that Russia
has not yet withdrawn to its pre 7 August positions as the EU has made clear
that it must. We therefore urge Russia
to fully implement both the 12 August and 8 September EU brokered peace
agreements. We are also concerned that OSCE as well as EU monitors have still
been prevented from entering South Ossetia.” [3]
Despite all this, Miliband didn’t
oppose resumption on behalf of Britain. Miliband the mouth has become Miliband the
mouse.
The only state that held out against
resumption was Lithuania,
but the resumption didn’t require unanimity amongst member states (apparently
because the negotiations were not suspended last September, merely postponed).
EU External Relations Commissioner,
Benita Ferrero-Waldner, made a lame attempt to counter the assumption that the
EU had climbed down:
"This does not mean that we are giving a gift to Russia and this
does not mean that we are changing our very firm position on the events of the
summer. Russia’s
action over Georgia
remains unacceptable.” [2]
In reality, the EU has now
terminated its very mild sanction against Russia for this action.
Much more important, the EU has accepted
the result of that action, which is that South Ossetia and Abkhazia are no
longer part of Georgia
in any meaningful sense, and won’t be for the foreseeable future. The EU may not have recognized them as
independent states, as Russia
has done, but it has abandoned any challenge to Russia’s
insistence, backed up with Russian military force, that they are not going to
be governed from Tbilisi.
Negotiations postponed
An extraordinary meeting of the
European Council on 1 September 2008, called to consider events in Georgia, took the decision to postpone the scheduled
negotiations on a partnership agreement with Russia. The Council conclusions stated:
“Until [Russian] troops
have withdrawn to the positions held prior to 7 August, meetings on the negotiation
of the Partnership Agreement will be postponed.” [4]
Russia withdrew its troops from Georgia outside South
Ossetia and Abkazia. However,
Russia stated plainly from
the outset that it intended to keep thousands of troops in South
Ossetia and Abkhazia for the foreseeable future. On 8 September 2008, the Russian Defence
Minister, Anatoly Serdyukov, said that 3,800 troops would be stationed in each
area [5]. That is a great deal more than the number
deployed prior to 7 August 2008, when it is generally believed there were about
1,000 troops under Russian command in South Ossetia
and 2,500 in Abkhazia.
So, there
isn’t the slightest doubt that Russian troops haven’t been withdrawn to their
positions prior to 7 August 2008.
Nevertheless, the EU has resumed negotiations with Russia.
EU Monitoring Mission
As
president of the EU, President Sarkozy brokered a ceasefire between Russia and Georgia on 12 August 2008. The text of the ceasefire agreement (given in
a press release from an EU foreign ministers meeting the next day [6]
(p 6-7)) consists of a set of principles and is very imprecise. On the withdrawal of Russian troops, the
agreement says:
“Russian
military forces will have to withdraw to the lines held prior to the outbreak
of hostilities. Pending an international mechanism, Russian peace-keeping
forces will implement additional security measures;” (point 5)
In the
first sentence, Russia
signed up to withdrawing its forces to the positions held prior to 7 August – eventually. The second sentence allowed Russia to keep troops inside Georgia proper on the borders of South Ossetia and Abkhazia until an international
monitoring mechanism was in place.
On 8
September 2008, President Sarkozy went back to Moscow,
and then to Tbilisi,
to make arrangements for the implementation of the agreement of 12 August (see [7]
for the text of what was agreed). Part
of these arrangements was:
“the deployment of
additional observers in the areas adjacent to South Ossetia and Abkhazia in
sufficient numbers to replace the Russian peacekeeping [sic] forces by 1
October 2008, including at least 200 European Union observers.”
The EU observers,
aka the European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM Georgia), were
deployed as arranged by 1 October 2008 and Russian troops withdrew into South Ossetia and Abkhazia, more or less.
(It was
also agreed that UN and OSCE international monitors would continue to be
deployed within Abkhazia and South Ossetia
respectively, as they were prior to the outbreak of hostilities. Russia
insisted on monitors in Georgia
proper, and insisted that they came from the EU, because, since Georgia is keen
to join the EU, the presence of EU monitors is likely to restrain it from
repeating its aggression of 7 August.)
The agreement
with Russia provided for the
deployment of EU observers “in the areas adjacent to South Ossetia and Abkhazia”, but
not within these areas – which implied that the EU accepted that these areas
were no longer really part of Georgia. However, in order to sell the agreement In
Tbilisi, Sarkozy gave the false impression that Russia
had agreed to their deployment inside South Ossetia and Abkhazia, saying as he stood alongside Georgian
President Saakashvili:
“The spirit of the text
is that they (the EU observers) will have a mandate to enter (Abkhazia and South Ossetia), to observe, to report.” [8]
This produced a fierce response from
Moscow, Foreign
Minister Sergei Lavrov saying:
“This is an absolutely
immoral attempt to explain dishonestly to Mr Saakashvili what obligations were
taken on by the European Union and what obligations by Russia. Additional international observers will be
deployed precisely around South Ossetia and
Abkhazia and not inside these republics.” [8]
Nevertheless, the EU legislation
specifying the mandate for EUMM Georgia
(Council Joint Action 2008/736/CFSP of 15
September 2008 [9]) describes
its area of operation as Georgia
without mentioning South Ossetia and Abkhazia,
so it meant to include them. A statement
from the head of the mission, Hansjörg Haber, on 4 November 2008 underlined
this, saying:
“EUMM
has a Georgia-wide mandate, thus including Abkhazia and South
Ossetia. We are here to observe compliance with the peace
agreements of 12 August and 8 September by all sides, contribute to
stabilisation and normalisation of the situation on the ground and help
confidence-building.
“However,
EUMM is a civilian and unarmed mission. We cannot and we do not want to force
our way. We can only go where there is cooperation. It is the task of our
monitors to knock on the doors and request access to Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Therefore, our patrols approach the
Russian, Abkhaz and South Ossetian checkpoints along the administrative
boundary line. We approach the staff of the checkpoints in a friendly manner,
try to establish contacts and explain our mandate. We will continue this
confidence-building work.” [10]
Up to now,
in line with the arrangements made with Sarkozy in Moscow
on 12 September 2008, Russia
has refused to allow EU observers into South Ossetia
and Abkhazia (see interview with Hansjörg Haber on 27 March 2009 [11])
By having
EU monitors seek access South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the EU is expressing its
formal position that Georgia
includes South Ossetia and Abkhazia. By refusing to make an issue of Russia’s
refusal to grant them access, the EU is accepting the reality that they are now
separate entities under Russian protection.
NATO
2 December 2008 was a very good day
for Russia. Not only did the EU resume negotiations with
it on a partnership agreement, but, a few hours later in another part of Brussels, NATO foreign ministers decided to resume contact
with Russia
within the NATO-Russia Council. Miliband
the mouth was party to this decision as well, as was US Secretary of State, Condoleezza
Rice.
Contact with Russia within
the NATO-Russia Council had been broken off in August. A special NATO foreign ministers meeting on
19 August 2008 concluded:
“In 2002, we established the NATO-Russia
Council, a framework for discussions with Russia,
including on issues that divide the Alliance and
Russia. We have determined that we cannot continue
with business as usual.” [12]
But on 2 December 2008, NATO
reversed gear. True, in the communiqué
at the end of the meeting [13], NATO condemned
Russia for its “disproportionate
military actions during the conflict with Georgia
in August” and for its “subsequent recognition of the South Ossetia and
Abkhazia regions of Georgia,
which we condemn and call upon Russia
to reverse”. In addition, NATO demanded
that Russia “implement fully
the commitments agreed with Georgia,
as mediated by the EU on 12 August and 8 September 2008” and allow “full access
by international monitors”.
Nevertheless, the foreign ministers
“mandated the Secretary
General [of NATO] to re-engage with Russia
at the political level; agreed to informal discussions in the NRC [NATO-Russia
Council]; and requested the Secretary General to report back to us prior to any
decision to engage Russia
formally in the NRC.”
Neither Rice nor Miliband opposed
this resumption of relations with Russia.
Neither Rice nor Miliband pressed
for Membership Action Plans (MAPs) for Georgia
and the Ukraine
either.
On 3 April 2008, at a heads of state
meeting in Bucharest, NATO had decided in
principle to allow Ukraine
and Georgia
to become full members. But, Germany, France and other states successfully resisted
intense pressure from the US
(with the support of the UK)
to draw up MAPs for Ukraine
and Georgia
right away.
The foreign ministers’ communiqué on
2 December 2008 reaffirmed “all elements of the decisions regarding Ukraine and Georgia
taken by our Heads of State and Government in Bucharest”.
But, the US and the UK didn’t press
for MAPs this time, presumably because they knew that they weren’t going to
succeed. It looks as if NATO’s eastward
march is an end.
President Sarkozy’s role
When President
Sarkozy came to power, he sounded as if he was going to be much more
pro-American than his predecessors. But,
in his dealings with Russia
in the aftermath of the hostilities in Georgia,
he sidelined the US
and placed the EU centre stage. It is
impossible to believe that this would have happened had any state other than France happened
to hold the EU presidency at the time.
It is also impossible to believe that all other EU states were happy
with Sarkozy’s sidelining of the US
– for example, Britain and
the former Soviet bloc states, which have welcomed the exercise of US power in
eastern Europe since the end of the Cold War.
What’s the
evidence for this? First, Sarkozy’s
first trip to Moscow on 12 August 2008 to broker
a ceasefire was opposed by the US. He said so, when he addressed the European
Parliament as President of the European Council on 21 October 2008 [14]. Without directly naming the US (or the UK), he also said that “some were
saying” that dialogue was useless and there had to be a military response
(which he described as “madness”).
Here’s the
passage on Georgia
from his speech:
“We [the French
presidency] wanted this Europe first of all to be united – which wasn’t that simple
-, to think independently – because the world needs Europe
to think independently – and be proactive. If Europe
has things to say, it must not just say them, it must do them. First of all we
had the war, with the Russians’ wholly disproportionate reaction in the
Georgian conflict. I use the words advisedly. I say ‘disproportionate’ because
it is disproportionate to intervene as the Russians intervened in Georgia. But I
use the word ‘reaction’ because while the reaction was disproportionate, there
had been a wholly inappropriate action before. Europe
must be fair and not hesitate to break out of ideological mindsets to promote a
message of peace.
On 8 August, the crisis
erupted. On 12 August Bernard Kouchner and I were in Moscow to obtain the ceasefire. I’m not
saying what was done was perfect, I’m simply saying that in four days Europe got a ceasefire. And at the beginning of
September, Europe got the commitment to a
withdrawal to the pre-8 August positions. In two months, Europe
obtained the end of a war and withdrawal of the occupation troops. There were
several possibilities. Some were saying
– and they had reasons for doing so – that dialogue was useless and that the
response to the military action had to be military: madness! Europe
has seen the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War. Europe must not be an accessory to a new cold war,
entered solely because people lost their cool.
“This
was a problem we overcame with our American allies, who thought that the visit
to Moscow
wasn’t timely. Despite everything, we acted hand in hand with our American
allies. They had a position which wasn’t the same as ours. We tried to build
collaboration rather than opposition. And frankly, given the state of the world
today, I don’t think it needs a crisis between Europe and Russia. That
would be irresponsible. We can therefore defend our ideas on respect for
sovereignty, on respect for Georgia’s
integrity, on human rights and on our differences with those who govern Russia. But it
would have been irresponsible to create the conditions for a clash we
absolutely didn’t need. The discussions have begun in Geneva
on the future status of the Georgian territories of South
Ossetia and Abkhazia. I’m told they’ve got off to a difficult
start. Who could imagine it being any other way? But what’s important is that
they are starting. I have to say, moreover, that President Medvedev has
honoured the commitments he made before the Commission and European Council
presidencies when we went to Moscow
at the beginning of September.
“Europe has brought peace. Europe obtained the withdrawal
of an occupation army and Europe wanted the
international discussions. It seems to me that it’s been a long time since Europe has played such a role in a conflict of this kind.
I can of course see all the ambiguities, all the inadequacies, all the
compromises it’s been necessary to make, but in all conscience I think we have
obtained the maximum of what was possible, and, above all, President [of the
Parliament] Pöttering, if Europe hadn’t made the voice of dialogue and reason
heard, who would have made it heard? When Bernard Kouchner and I left on 12
August for Moscow and Tbilisi,
all the world media were well aware that the Russians were 40 km from Tbilisi and the goal was
to topple Mr Saakashvili’s regime. That was the reality. We were very close to
disaster but thanks to Europe, a determined Europe, there was no disaster, even
though, President Pöttering, there will, of course, be a long way to go before
tensions calm down in that part of the world.”
Needless
to say, Sarkozy was not in the business of minimising his achievements as the
holder of the EU presidency, nor of the degree to which Russia shifted
ground due to his intervention on behalf of the EU. In reality, Russia
got what it wanted – South Ossetia and Abkhazia as separate entities under
Russian military protection and unlikely to be ruled from Tbilisi ever again.
David Morrison
5 April 2009
www.david-morrison.com
References:
[1] www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/1228249921.6
[2] www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/eu-overrules-lithuania-russia-talks/article-177071
[3] www.fco.gov.uk/en/newsroom/latest-news/?view=PressR&id=8975097
[4] www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/102545.pdf
[5] news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/7606072.stm
[6] www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/IMG/pdf/General_Affairs_and_External_Relations_meeting
_August_20008.pdf
[7]
pastel.diplomatie.gouv.fr/editorial/actual/ael2/bulletin.gb.asp?liste=20080909.gb.html
[8] www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/1221053525.22/
[9] eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:248:0026:01:EN:HTML
[10] consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/081105-HoM_on_ABK.pdf
[11] www.eumm.eu/en/press_and_public_information/features/1170
[12] www.nato.int/docu/pr/2008/p08-104e.html
[13] www.nato.int/docu/pr/2008/p08-153e.html
[14] www.france-in-india.org/en/article.php3?id_article=3361