The London bombings
Blair
forced to change spin
“Events
in Iraq are continuing to act as motivation and a focus of a range of terrorist
related activity in the UK”
These words
are from an assessment, drawn up in mid-June 2005, by the UK’s Joint Terrorism
Analysis Centre (JTAC), in which the police and customs are represented along
with the intelligence services. This
(and other) leaked extracts from it were published
in the New York Times on 19 July 2005.
The Government has not denied that this is an authentic extract
from a JTAC assessment from mid-June.
JTAC was
created in June 2003 “as the UK's centre for the analysis and assessment of
international terrorism”, according to MI5’s website here, which describes its
role as follows:
“JTAC
analyses and assesses all intelligence relating to international terrorism, at
home and overseas, and produces assessments of threats and other
terrorist-related subjects for customers from a wide range of government
departments and agencies.”
It is inconceivable that the Prime
Minister was not a JTAC customer and was not familiar with this assessment on 7
July 2005 when London was bombed.
Heightened threat predicted
Before the invasion in March 2003,
the intelligence services were of the opinion that the threat from al-Qaida
would be heightened by military action against Iraq (see the Intelligence
& Security Committee report published in September 2003, paragraphs 125-127),
information which the Prime Minister was careful to keep from the House of
Commons, lest it refuse to vote for the invasion.
In other words, the intelligence services predicted in advance that the
invasion of Iraq would act as a stimulus to al-Qaida activity in general. Judging by the leaked sentence from the JTAC
assessment, they now seem to be saying that, by stirring up Muslim antagonism
towards Britain, the invasion and its aftermath has acted as a stimulus to
al-Qaida activity directed against Britain in particular - and heightened the
al-Qaida threat to Britain.
Having said that, London would probably not have been attacked without a
specific decision by the al-Qaida leadership that such an attack should be
mounted. And there is little doubt that
such a decision was taken in order to punish Britain for
allying itself with the US in the invasion of Iraq.
Remember, in
the autumn of 2003, in a message broadcast on al-Jezeera on 18 October 2003,
bin Laden reserved the right to retaliate against all countries involved in
Iraq “especially the UK, Spain,
Australia, Poland, Japan and Italy” (see transcript of message here). Following this message, 19 Italian
Carabinieri were killed in Nasiriyah in Iraq on 12 November 2003, British
interests were attacked in Istanbul on 20 November 2003, and nearly 200 people
were killed in the Madrid train bombings on 11 March 2004.
Protecting Blair’s skin
There is some doubt about the precise meaning of the JTAC assessment,
but there is no doubt that it postulates a connection between events in Iraq
brought about by Bush and Blair and al-Qaida activity in Britain. Despite knowing this, in the aftermath of
the London bombings, Blair and other ministers gave the impression that there
was no connection – while not specifically denying the existence of a
connection.
The formulation they used was to point out that al-Qaida’s targets have
been many and various, and that many al-Qaida attacks, including 9/11 itself,
took place before the invasion of Iraq.
Listeners were meant to infer from this that Blair’s Iraqi adventure was
not the trigger for the London bombings – and therefore he should not be
blamed. The formulation was not
designed to inform the British public accurately: it was designed to protect
Blair’s skin.
Blair deployed this formulation in an interview
with James Naughtie on BBC Radio 4’sToday programme on 9 July
2005. He was asked:
“Have you ever worried in the last two days - has it crossed your mind
just as an individual – that if you hadn’t gone to war that we might have been
spared this?”
He replied:
“What was
interesting, round the table [at the G8] was, if you take President Putin, who
was passionately opposed to the war in Iraq, and yet suffered Beslan, if you
think of Bali, and what happened there, if you think that even after the change
of government in Madrid, the terrorists there were planning further terrorist
acts before they were caught, fortunately for the people of Spain, and if you
remember that September 11, that was the reason we went into Afghanistan,
September 11 happened before Iraq, before Afghanistan, before any of these
issues, and that was the worst terrorist atrocity of all.“
There, he
doesn’t specifically deny a connection between Britain’s going to war in Iraq
and the bombings in London on 7 July 2005.
But listeners were meant to gather that since al-Qaida carried out
attacks before the invasion of Iraq, and even of Afghanistan, these actions
couldn’t have been the trigger for an al-Qaida attack on London in 2005.
Of course,
this formulation doesn’t prove that these actions couldn’t have been the
trigger. After all, the factors that
led al-Qaida to attack London in 2005 may have been very different from the factors
that led it to attack New York in 2001.
Events post 9/11, for example, Britain’s support for the US invasions of
Afghanistan and Iraq might well have influenced al-Qaida in making Britain a
target in 2005.
The
formulation neither proves nor disproves a connection between the bombings and
Britain’s support for the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. Nevertheless, in the traditional New Labour
manner, it was repeated over and over again, as a defence against accusations
that there was a connection, by Ministers and by the Prime Minister’s official
spokesman.
(And by
Conservative shadow ministers, with whom the formulation seems to have been
shared in advance. For example, on BBC
Radio 4’s Any Questions on the day after the bombings, David Cameron, faced
with the apt question: “Are we starting to reap that which we have sown?”, responded:
“I don’t
think, I don’t think that’s the right way to look at it. … we’ve got to be clear about this, the 9/11
attacks, the bombs in the Kenyan embassy, the Tanzanian embassy, the first
World Trade Center bomb, the attack on the USS Cole, all happened before the
Iraq war.”)
Official line until 19 July
Until 19 July 2005, this was the
line from the Government and the Conservative opposition. (As usual, the Liberal Democrats took the
path of least resistance: they didn’t use the official line, but they didn’t
challenge it either). To quote just a
few examples:
(1) In reply to Alex Salmond in the House of Commons on 11
July 2005, Blair said:
“The one
thing that is obvious from the long list of countries that have been victims of
this type of terrorism that I read out is that it does not discriminate greatly
between individual items of policy. I am afraid that I must tell the hon.
Gentleman that it is a form of terrorism aimed at our way of life, not at any
particular Government or policy.”
(2)
According to the Downing Street website here, at his morning
briefing on 13 July 2005, the Prime Minister’s official spokesman said:
“… the Prime Minister's view was very firmly that it was misplaced to
think this problem arose out of Iraq. This problem was there before Iraq - 9/11
was in 2001, not 2003. As the Foreign Secretary said in a recent interview that
the problems in Afghanistan were there before the Iraq War, and the attacks
that took place in Kenya and elsewhere were also before the Iraq War. It was
therefore in the Prime Minister's view a mistake to say that this was a problem
which had arisen out of the Iraq War. The reality was that each of these events
was a symptom of a wider problem.”
(3) On 16 July 2005, addressing a
Labour Party audience in London, Blair dismissed any connection between the
bombings and British action in Iraq, with the rhetorical question:
“If it is Iraq that motivates them, why is the same ideology killing Iraqis
by terror in defiance of an elected Iraqi Government?”
(4) On 18 July 2005, the Prime Minister’s official
spokesman was asked about an article entitled ‘Riding Pillion for Tackling Terrorism is
a High-risk Policy’
in a Briefing
Note on terrorism just published by Chatham House (and the subject of The
Guardian’s lead story that morning).
The article said:
“A key problem … is that the UK government has been conducting
counter-terrorism policy ‘shoulder to shoulder’ with the US, not in the sense
of being an equal decision-maker, but rather as pillion passenger compelled to
leave the steering to the ally in the driving seat. There is no doubt that the
situation over Iraq has imposed particular difficulties for the UK, and for the
wider coalition against terrorism. It gave a boost to the Al-Qaeda network’s
propaganda, recruitment and fundraising, caused a major split in the coalition,
provided an ideal targeting and training area for Al-Qaeda-linked terrorists …”
The account of the exchange on the Downing Street website here is as follows:
“Asked if
the Prime Minister rejected this morning's report suggesting that there could
be a link made between the war in Iraq and recruitment of terrorists, the PMOS
said that he thought it was better if we actually posed ourselves the same
questions that reality posed to us. Was there terrorism from Al Qaida and its
associates before Iraq? Answer: Yes. There had been attacks in 26 countries
over the past 12 years. Was there terrorism before Afghanistan emanating from
Al Qaida and its associates? Answer: Yes. Did the attack on 9/11 come directly
from people who were implicated in Afghanistan? Answer: Yes.”
In
all of these, while not specifically denying that there was a link between the
war in Iraq and al-Qaida activity in general, and the London bombings in
particular, the impression was given that no link existed.
Straw misrepresentation
Jack Straw responded to the
Chatham house article on BBC News 24 on 18 July 2005. The edited version of his response on the Foreign Office website here
is as follows:
“I'm
astonished if Chatham House is now saying that we should not have stood
shoulder to shoulder with our long standing allies in the United States. But
let me also say this the time for excuses for terrorism are over, the
terrorists have struck across the world in countries allied with the United
States, backing the war in Iraq and in countries which had nothing whatever to
do with the war in Iraq. They struck in Kenya, in Tanzania, in Indonesia, in
the Yemen. They struck this weekend in Turkey which was not supporting our
action in Iraq.”
Straw’s record for brazen
misrepresentation is second only to the occupant of 10 Downing Street. This is a fine example of his capabilities
in this field.
First, he misrepresented the
Chatham House article, which did not say that Britain should not have stood
shoulder to shoulder with the US; it merely said that invading Iraq had boosted
al-Qaida, a conclusion with which the UK intelligence services concurred, as Straw knew when he spoke.
Second, he misrepresented the nature of al-Qaida targets: he knows that
the targets in Kenya, Tanzania and Yemen were American, and the attack on Bali
in Indonesia was directed at Australian tourists; he also knows that the recent
attack in Turkey was by a Kurdish separatist organization, not al-Qaida.
Difficult to hold the line
When it came into the public domain on 18 July 2005, the Chatham House
article rattled the Government, even though it contained very little concrete
information. It made it difficult for
the Government to hold the “no connection with Iraq” line. There was worse to follow: the next morning
the New York Times reported on the JTAC assessment from mid-June, which
contained the sentence (quoted above):
"Events
in Iraq are continuing to act as motivation and a focus of a range of terrorist
related activity in the UK”
What is more, an ICM poll published in The Guardian the same morning
suggested that nearly two thirds of the British people thought that there was
some sort of connection between the London bombings and the invasion of Iraq. Asked (see ICM website here):
“To what extent, if at all, do you think each of the following is
responsible for the London bombings?”
the reply for “Tony Blair for his
decision to invade Iraq” was
A lot |
A little |
Not at all |
Don’t know |
33% |
31% |
28% |
8% |
A remarkable 64% of the British public thought that Blair was to some
extent responsible for the London bombings because he had taken Britain to war
in Iraq.
It was now public knowledge that the intelligence services believed that
events in Iraq were acting as a recruiting sergeant for al-Qaida and, before
this information came into the public domain, nearly two thirds of the public
believed there was some connection between events in Iraq and the London
bombings.
New line: extremists will use Iraq
At this point, it was impossible to hold the “no connection with Iraq”
line: a certain amount of slithering away from this position was urgently
required. The new trick was to say
that, of course, extremists will use Iraq (and other issues) to further
their ends. This formulation could at a
considerable stretch be reconciled with the JTAC assessment that “events
in Iraq are continuing to act as motivation and a focus of a range of terrorist
related activity in the UK”.
From 19 July 2005 onwards, the
Government machine repeated this new line ad nauseam. It began at the Prime Minister’s official
spokesman’s morning briefing on 19 July
2005:
“Asked for
a reaction to the view expressed by the Muslim Council of Great Britain and
Zaki Badawi, the head of the Muslim College, that the Prime Minister must
understand that the Iraq war had contributed to the feelings of social dislocation,
exclusion and disillusionment with mainstream politics, particularly among
Muslim youths, the PMOS pointed out that it was not the Government who had
carried out the London bombings. They had been carried out by
extremists. We recognised that some people would use issues such as
Iraq, Israel/Palestine and Afghanistan to further their aims [my
emphasis].”
It was repeated by Blair later
that day at a joint press conference with Hamid Karzai, the President of
Afghanistan. Asked:
“… another thing that people find
incomprehensible, 75% according to a poll this morning, is the argument that
there is absolutely no connection with our engagement in Iraq. At Chatham House, your own security advisors
and a very large percentage of this country, all think there is some
connection. Isn't that common sense?”
Blair replied:
“… let me just make one thing clear in
relation to people who say well the terrorism here is to do with Iraq, or it is
to do with Afghanistan, or other things. Of course, these terrorists
will use Iraq as an excuse, they will use Afghanistan. September 11, of course,
happened before both of those things, and then the excuse was American policy,
or Israel [my emphasis]. … Now,
yes, these people will use this as an excuse, but it doesn't make it
[terrorism] justified …”
Whether it makes it justified or
not is a subjective question. What
matters is the objective question: have events in Iraq since March 2003 been
useful to al-Qaida; have they increased its ability to recruit and
therefore carry out operations in the UK and elsewhere? Judging by the JTAC assessment from
mid-June, the answer to both these questions is Yes. Furthermore, it is most likely that the al-Qaida leadership took
a decision to strike London in order to punish Britain for its involvement in
Iraq, and without that involvement the attack would not have taken place.
Greater risk?
This point was pursued by journalists at this press conference. One asked:
“… I don't think anybody is saying, Prime
Minister, that the invasion of Iraq is any kind of justification, or indeed
anything else is any kind of justification for terrorism. I think the point
that is being put to you is that there is a link, and it seems to be recognised
by the JTAC apparently, by these two academics with the Chatham House
report yesterday and by the public in opinion polls, there seems to be a link
between the invasion of Iraq and a greater risk of terrorist activity in Britain.
You say the terrorists are using Iraq as their latest excuse. In a way that is
saying the same thing, isn't it, that we have become at greater risk, because,
whether or not the war is right or wrong, because of that invasion.”
Blair couldn’t give a straight answer to this question, since a Yes answer
meant acknowledging that his foreign policy choices had increased the threat to
Britain and a No answer was difficult to reconcile with the JTAC assessment, so
he blustered:
“As I say, how you try and put this together
is extremely important, because September 11 of course happened before Iraq,
before Afghanistan, and it was planned under the Presidency of President
Clinton, not President Bush. And my view is that they will use whatever is
going on in foreign policy to justify what they do, whether it is Iraq, or it
is Afghanistan, or it is Palestine, or it is just general the fact that Britain
is an ally of America. What I am really saying is this though, where does
that argument lead you that is the important thing. And what you have got to be
careful of is getting into their perverted logic, which says even if people
abhor the bombings in London; well nonetheless we understand why it has
happened because of what has happened in Iraq.”
Later another journalist tried, asking:
“So you don't accept that the invasion of
Iraq has acted as a recruiting sergeant for al Queda and made Britain a greater
target?”
Again, Blair didn’t answer the
question:
“Well they will use any issue, and before
Iraq it was Afghanistan, before Iraq and Afghanistan it was the Palestinian
issue, or support for the existence of Israel, not incidentally Israel and
Palestine living side by side in peace because that is what we support, but
support for the existence of Israel. Before all of those things it was America,
just America, what it does, what it is. They will always have a reason for
that, and yes they will use any issue to recruit people, they will recruit
people over Iraq, they were recruited over Afghanistan, they were recruited over
Palestine.”
Shortly after journalists tried to get the Prime Minister’s official
spokesman to answer the same question (see account here):
“Put to
him that by invading Iraq we had increased the likelihood of an attack and that
it did not seem a difficult connection, the PMOS suggest[ed] that people should
remember there had been a threat before Iraq. People should think back further
and ask themselves what was the reason for the 9/11 attacks. Put to him that
whilst everyone accepted that the UK had been a target for terrorism before the
invasion in Iraq, the invasion had raised the likelihood of attack, the PMOS
said that the Prime Minister's point was simple. It was wrong to imply and to suggest
that in some way we were not a target before Iraq. We were. It was equally
right to acknowledge, as the Prime Minister had at lunch time today, that
people would use Iraq, Afghanistan or Palestine or any number of other issues,
as an excuse in their terms, to try and justify their actions. They would do
that come what may. It was however wrong, in the Prime Minister's view to try
and link a foreign policy with a threat from terrorism. That threat existed
beforehand, that threat would seize on anything to try and justify its actions.
That did not mean however that the threat had been fundamentally altered. The
root cause of the threat was not Iraq, the route cause of the threat was not
Afghanistan, the root cause was the perverse ideology that resulted in 9/11,
Kenya and all the other attacks.”
Never said it
A week later, on 26 July 2005, the Prime Minister denied ever
saying that there was no connection between the London bombings and Iraq. He told his July press
conference:
“I think, incidentally, I read occasionally
that I am supposed to have said it is nothing to do with Iraq, in inverted
commas. Actually I haven't said that.”
This is undoubtedly true. No
doubt, he had his minions check before he said it. But it is equally true that, from 7 July to 18 July, he gave the
consistent impression that there was no connection between the invasion of Iraq
and the attack on London. This
formulation was designed to fend off the inevitable criticism that he had
visited these awful events on London by invading Iraq.
But for events outside his control, he would still be giving this
impression. The shift in formulation
was not brought about by a desire to inform the public more accurately: it was
brought about by the realisation that the original formulation was indefensible
in the face of the leaked JTAC assessment, and the fact that nearly two thirds
of the public believed that he was at least partly responsible for the bombings
because of the invasion of Iraq.
Within a week, this figure became 85%: according to a YouGov poll published
in The Daily Mirror on 25 July 2005, 23% of people polled said that the war
was the main reason for the London bombings, and another 62% said that, while
Iraq was not the principle cause, it did contribute to the reasons behind the
bombings. A mere 12% said there was no
real link.
What MI5 says
MI5 has a web page here, headed THREAT TO THE UK FROM INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM. At the time of writing (21
August 2005), it says, inter alia:
“Though they
have a range of aspirations and ‘causes’, Iraq is a dominant issue for a
range of extremist groups and individuals in the UK and Europe [my
emphasis]. Some individuals who support the insurgency are known to have
travelled to Iraq in order to fight against coalition forces. In the
longer term, it is possible that they may later return to the UK and consider
mounting attacks here.”
The general message here is in
line with the JTAC assessment from mid-June, which came into the public domain
on 19 July 2005. This linking of
al-Qaida activity in Britain with Iraq has been on the MI5 web page since the
page was altered on 19 July 2005 – at the latest. I don’t know if it was there earlier, but it seems unlikely since
it isn’t consistent with “no connection with Iraq” formulation, pumped out by
the Government before 19 July 2005.
Al-Qaida’s political demands
Blair’s characterisation of the
motivation of those who bombed London has also shifted since the days
immediately after 7 July. Then, we were
told by Government and Opposition alike that the bombers were out to “destroy
our way of life”. For example, Blair told
the House of Commons on 11 July 2005:
“Together, we will ensure that,
though terrorists can kill, they will never destroy the way of life that we
share and value, which we will defend with such strength of belief and
conviction that it will be to us and not to the terrorists that victory will
belong.”
On behalf of the Conservative
Party, Michael Howard agreed
that our “way of life” was under attack:
“I want to begin by paying tribute to him [the Prime Minister] for the
calm, resolute and statesmanlike way in which the Government responded to last
Thursday's attack on our capital city, on our citizens and on our way of life.
“
However, within a week or so of the bombings, Blair
had stopped using this formulation, and admitted that, like the IRA, al-Qaida
had political demands. For example,
speaking to a Labour Party audience on 16 July 2005, he said:
“Neither is it true that they have no
demands. They do. It is just that no sane person would negotiate on
them. They demand the elimination of Israel; the withdrawal of all
westerners from Muslim countries, irrespective of the wishes of people and
Government; the establishment of effectively Taleban states and Sharia law in
the Arab world en route to one Caliphate of all Muslim nations.”
One might argue about whether this is an accurate
description of al-Qaida demands, but at least the Prime Minister has apparently
got the message that its demands are concerned with the Muslim world and are
not about changing Western societies.
IRA & al-Qaida
In late July, when the IRA was in the news because it
announced the end of its military campaign, it was natural that journalists
would draw an analogy between the IRA campaign and the more recent bombings in
London. At Blair’s press conference on
26 July 2005, a journalist asked:
“… the fact is your uncompromising language
does not fit easily with the fact that political realities, real politick as
you put it, of having to deal at some level with terrorists. These terrorists
have real demands too. The IRA wanted us out of Ireland and a lot of these
people just want us, rightly or wrongly, out of the Middle East, out of Islam,
and everybody in this room knows that, except you, apparently they do, they do,
many of them have negotiable demands.”
Blair replied:
“…
they do indeed have demands, but they are not demands any sensible person can
negotiate on … . And the reason for negotiating with the IRA is nothing to do
with terrorism, the reason for being prepared to enter into a dialogue with
Republicanism is because you do have a demand that is, I may agree or disagree
with it, but you can hardly say it is a demand that no sensible person can
negotiate on, it is a demand that is shared by many of our citizens in the
north. So I genuinely think that is different.”
There, Blair acknowledged that both the IRA and al-Qaida
have political demands. Surprisingly,
he did not rule out negotiations with al-Qaida on principle, but only on the
grounds that, unlike the IRA, al-Qaida’s demands are not shared by many
people. In fact, al-Qaeda’s strength is
that its core demand that Western interference in the Muslim world be ended is
shared by the vast bulk of the Muslim world.
David Morrison
Labour & Trade Union Review
21 August 2005